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diction of the objective reality of what occurred is contrary to general tax
convention. 05 The Willis decision, accordingly, provides little guidance to
practitioners attempting to characterize the nature of a loss deduction
resulting from a lapsed option when the identity of the underlying property

is ambiguous.
H. FRASIER IvEs

VIII.
A.

TORTS

Defining Punitive Damages Under the
Federal Tort Claims Act

In 1946, Congress enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act' (FTCA) to allow
injured parties the right to initiate tort claims against the United States. 2 The
105. See supra notes 64-76 and accompanying text (analysis of tax convention that intent
not relevant to determination of tax consequences unless statute turns on intent).
1. Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, tit. iv, 60 Stat. 843 (1946) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1982)). The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) grants exclusive jurisdiction
to United States district courts over civil claims against the United States for injury caused by
a government employee, acting within the scope of his employment, under circumstances in
which a private individual would be liable. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982). The FTCA states that
the United States shall be held liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under similar circumstances. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982). The liability of the United
States under the FTCA is subject to certain qualifications and exceptions. See 28 U.S.C. §§
2671-2680 (1982). For example, § 2674 of the FTCA states that the United States shall not be
liable for interest accrued on damage awards prior to judgment or for punitive damages. 28
U.S.C. § 2674 (1982). See infra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing § 2674 of FTCA).
2. H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1945). Prior to enactment of the FTCA,
courts held that the federal government was immune to tort actions under the common law
doctrine of sovereign or governmental immunity. See German Bank v. United States, 148 U.S.
573, 579 (1893) (well settled rule of law that government is not liable for nonfeasances,
misfeasances or negligence of its officers). Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, a sovereign
or government is immune from any suit to which it has not consented. See Feres v. United
States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950). The United States Supreme Court in Kawananakoav. Polyblank
summarized the rationale of sovereign immunity by stating that no legal right can exist against
the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907). See
generally Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-1925);
Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1, 751, 1039 (1926-1927); Government
Responsibility in Tort, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 577, 734 (1928) (eight-part series comprehensive
critical review of government's tort liability prior to passage of FTCA).
While the doctrine of sovereign immunity stood as a bar to initiating suit on a tort claim
against the United States, relief was available through passage of a private relief bill in Congress.
H.R. REP. No. 1287, supra, at 2. A private relief bill was an appeal to the legislature for relief
by a private individual who had been injured by the tortious conduct of the United States. See
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FTCA holds the federal government liable for tortious acts that government
employees commit while acting within the scope of their employment. 3 The
FTCA mandates that courts must determine the government's liability in
accordance with the law of the state where the tort occurred. 4 As a result, a
court may hold the United States liable for its tortious acts in the same
manner and to the same extent as a court would hold a private citizen liable
under the law of the state where the tort occurred. 5 The FTCA, however,
does limit the liability of the United States by proscribing punitive damage
awards. 6 In Flannery v. United States,7 the Fourth Circuit considered whether
damages defined as compensatory under the laN' of the state where the tort
occurred, but which exceed the plaintiff's compensable losses, fall within the
punitive damage proscription of the FTCA.8
In Flannery, an automobile owned by the United States and operated by
a government employee on official business struck plaintiff Michael Flannery's car. 9 As a result of extensive brain damage suffered in the accident,
Holtzoff, The Handling of Tort Claims Against the Federal Government, 9 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 311, 322 (1942). Passage of a private relief bill resulted in either a direct appropriation
for payment of the claim or a grant of the privilege to sue in either the Court of Claims or a
United States district court. Id. at 322-26. See Note, Private Bills in Congress, 79 HARv. L.
Rav. 1684, 1688-93 (1965-1966) (describing procedural aspects of private bills). The private
relief bill system was criticized as being burdensome to Congress, unjust to claimants and nonuniform in application. H.R. REP. No. 1287, supra, at 2. In response to the rapid expansion
of governmental activities, the growing burden of the private relief bill system on Congress,
and the injustice to claimants, Congress created the FTCA to grant to private individuals the
right to sue the federal government for tortious conduct. Id. at 2-3. See generally L. JAYSON, 1
PERSONAL INYURY: HANDL NG FEDERAL TORT CLA.ws §§ 51-64 (1984) (tracing legislative history
of FTCA); Gottlieb, The FederalTort Claims Act-A Statutory Interpretation, 35 GEo. L.J. 1
(1946-1947) (discussing legislative history of and analyzing FTCA).
3. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (1982).
4. See Indian Towing Co., Inc. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64-65 (1955) (test for
determining federal government liability under FTCA is whether private person would be liable
for similar acts of negligence under laws of state where wrong occurred); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b),
2674 (1982) (United States shall be liable for tort claims in same manner and to same extent as
private individual under similar circumstances).
5. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141 (1950) (purpose of FTCA was not to
create new causes of action but to force United States to accept liability under circumstances
that would result in liability to private defendants); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (1982).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982). Section 2674 of the FTCA specifically provides that while
the United States shall be liable for tort claims under circumstances that would result in private
liability, the United States shall not be liable for interest on damage awards prior to judgment
or for punitive damages. Id. See, e.g., Fitch v. United States, 513 F.2d 1013, 1016 (6th Cir.)
(district court's award of punitive damages in action brought under FTCA violated explicit bar
of punitive awards under § 2674), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 866 (1975); Knouff v. United States,
74 F.R.D. 555, 557 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (plaintiff not entitled to punitive damages in action against
United States brought under FTCA for injuries arising out of plane crash); Platis v. United
States, 288 F. Supp. 254, 274 (D. Utah 1968) (punitive damages are not recoverable in wrongful
death action brought under § 2674 of FTCA), aff'd, 409 F.2d 1009 (10th Cir. 1969).
7. 718 F.2d 108 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2679 (1984).
8. Id. at 110-13; see infra notes 24-42 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's
holding in Flannery v. United States).
9. 718 F.2d at 110-13. In Flannery v. United States, William F. Willien, an employee of
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'
the plaintiff became permanently comatose.' 0 William Flannery, as committee
for Michael Flannery, filed a personal injury claim under the FTCA against
the United States in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of West Virginia.' 2 The district court applied West Virginia law in separate
trials on the issues of liability and damages and found the United States
liable for the injuries to the plaintiff. 3 Consequently, the district court

the United States Coast Guard, was driving a United States government automobile that struck
Michael Flannery's car. Flannery v. United States, No. 76-0306-H, slip op. at I (S.D. W. Va.,
Jan. 22, 1980). The accident occurred at an intersection in Huntington, West Virginia on
October 27, 1974. Id. at 1-2.
10. Slip op. at 10. In Flannery, the plaintiff, Michael Flannery, was 22 years old at the
time of the accident. Id. at 2. The plaintiff was hospitalized from October 28, 1974 through
April 22, 1975. Id. After the accident, the plaintiff was diagnosed as permanently comatose
and had a life expectancy of only 30 years (as measured from 1978). Id. The district court
noted that while it was unlikely that the plaintiff would require sophisticated medical treatment,
he would demand constant nursing and custodial care. Id. Plaintiff's parents had provided
custodial care since April 1975 and planned to continue to do so as long as they were capable.
Id.
A person is permanently comatose when in a state of profound unconsciousness from
which he cannot be roused. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DIcIONARY (5th ed. 1982). A person is
semicomatose when in a state of unconsciousness from which he is capable of being aroused.
Id. The record in Flannery is ambiguous as to the exact medical condition of the plaintiff. See
718 F.2d at 110-11. The Fourth Circuit referred to the plaintiff as permanently comatose with
no likelihood that he would ever become aware of events around him. Id. at 111. The district
court referred to the plaintiff's condition as being both permanently semicomatose and permanently irreversibly comatose. Slip op. at 2, 9, 10. The district court also described plaintiff as
"non-sentient." Id. at 8 n.5. A person is non-sentient when that person is incapable of
sensation. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, 1274 (5th ed. 1982) (defining sentient). The
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals described the plaintiff as permanently semicomatose
but unaware of his injuries and losses because of the severity of his injuries. Flannery v. United
States, 297 S.E.2d 433, 438 (XV. Va. Sup. Ct. App. 1982). The brief of the United States, in
the statement of the case, described the plaintiff's condition as a permanent, irreversible
comatose state. Brief for Appellant at 2, Flannery v. United States, 718 F.2d 108 (4th Cir.
1983). The plaintiff's brief did not contain its own statement of the case but agreed substantially
with the statement of the case contained in the United States' brief. Brief for Appellee at 1,
718 F.2d 108. The plaintiff's brief thus concurs with the United States' description of the
plaintiff as in a permanent, irreversible comatose state. Id. Whether the plaintiff's condition is
defined as semicomatose or comatose, all of the courts and parties in Flannery are in general
agreement that the plaintiff is unaware of his injuries and losses, and that his condition is
permanent.
11. Flannery v. United States, 649 F.2d 270, 271 (4th Cir. 1981). A committee, guardian
or next friend means one authorized to maintain an action for and in the name of another who
is non suisjuris, or legally incompetent to appear in a cause by himself or through an attorney.
Lockhart's Guardian v. Bailey Pond Creek Coal Co., 235 Ky. 278, 280, 30 S.W.2d 955, 957
(1930). In his permanently comatose state, Michael Flannery is non suis juris because he is
incompetent to appear in his FTCA action by himself or through an attorney. See supra note
10 and accompanying text (discussing medical condition of plaintiff in Flannery).
12. Flannery, slip op. at I.
13. Id. The FTCA directs a trial court to determine liability and assess damages in
accordance with the law of the state where the tort occurred. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (1982);
see Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 182 (1956) (damages determined by law of state
where tortious act committed, subject to limitations that United States is not liable for interest
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awarded the plaintiff approximately 2.2 million dollars in damages.

4

The

district court's damage award included 535,855 dollars for impairment of
earning capacity and 1,300,000 dollars for loss of the ability to enjoy life.'
The United States appealed the district court's calculation of damages
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.16 The United

States argued that West Virginia law does not allow a damage award for
loss of ability to enjoy life.

7

The United States also asserted that a court

must deduct federal income taxes when calculating an award for impairment
of earning capacity.

8

The Fourth Circuit found that existing West Virginia

case law provided an ambiguous answer on the issue of whether a court may
prior to judgment or for punitive damages); Arnhold v. United States, 284 F.2d 326, 328 (9th
Cir. 1960) (court must determine whether United States, if it had been a private party, would
have been liable for losses under state law), reh'g denied, 289 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 876 (1961); Mandelbaum v. United States, 251 F.2d 748, 750 (2d Cir. 1958)
(state law controls amount of government's tort liability).
The district court in Flannery ruled that the United States, by and through its employee
Willien, negligently and solely caused the injuries suffered by the plaintiff. Slip op. at 1. The
district court, therefore, held the United States liable to the plaintiff for his injuries under the
FTCA. Id. at 10-11; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (United States shall be liable for tort claims
in same manner and to same extent as private individual under similar circumstances).
14. Flannery, slip op. at 11.
15. Id. at 11. The district court in Flannery, over the United States' objection, calculated
the plaintiff's loss of earning capacity without deducting an amount equal to the federal income
taxes that would be levied on such earnings. Id. at 4-8. The district court ruled that West
Virginia law does not require consideration of federal income taxes when calculating impaired
earning capacity. Id.; see infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text (analysis of whether federal
income taxes must be considered when calculating an award for impaired earning capacity under
FTCA).
The district court also awarded $1,300,000 to the plaintiff on the ground that as a result
of the United States' negligence, the plaintiff, in his permanent comatose state, had been
deprived of the capacity to enjoy life. Flannery, slip op. at 9. The district court stated that the
$1,300,000 award was compensation for the plaintiff's total and permanent loss of the capacity
to enjoy life. Id.; see infra notes 59-68 and accompanying text (analysis of whether a comatose
plaintiff may recover for loss of capacity to enjoy life under FTCA). The district court also
awarded the plaintiff $48,174.80 for pretrial medical expenses and $316,984.00 for future
medical expenses. Flannery, slip op. at 10.
16. Flannery v. United States, 649 F.2d 270 (4th Cir. 1981). The United States in Flannery
accepted the district court's finding that the United States was liable for the plaintiff's injuries.
Id. at 271.
17. Id. at 271-72; see infra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing relevant West
Virginia law). The United States in Flannery argued that loss of the capacity to enjoy life is an
element of pain and suffering and therefore is necessarily dependent upon the plaintiff's
consciousness of his injury. Id. at 272. The United States also asserted that unless the plaintiff
can sense his loss of ability to enjoy life he cannot recover for that loss. Id.; see infra notes
59-68 and accompanying text (analysis of whether a comatose plaintiff may recover for loss of
capacity to enjoy life under FTCA).
18. 649 F.2d at 272. The United States in Flannery argued on appeal that the court must
use net wages after taxes to calculate lost future earnings because had the plaintiff not been
injured, the plaintiff would have had to deduct federal income taxes from his earnings. Id.; see
infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text (analysis of whether federal income taxes must be
considered when calculating an award for impaired earning capacity under FTCA). Alternatively,
the United States in Flannery argued that both the award for loss of capacity to enjoy life and
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award damages for loss of the ability to enjoy life.19 The Fourth Circuit also

found West Virginia law unclear as to whether a court must deduct federal
income taxes when calculating an award for impairment of earning capacity. 20
As a result, the Fourth Circuit certified the questions on calculation of
damages to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.2 1 The West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals ruled that under the West Virginia law a per22
manently comatose plaintiff could recover for loss of ability to enjoy life.
the award for lost future earnings were excessive. 649 F.2d at 272.
19. 649 F.2d at 272. The Fourth Circuit in Flannery stated that under West Virginia law
ambiguity existed as to whether the loss of the ability to enjoy life was separable from pain
and suffering. Id. at 272. If under West Virginia law loss of the capacity to enjoy life was not
separable from pain and suffering, then a comatose plaintiff could not recover for such a loss
because of his inability to sense and experience the loss. Id. West Virginia case law recognizes
the loss of capacity to enjoy life as an injury but does not clarify whether such an injury is
separable from pain and suffering thereby entitling a comatose plaintiff to recover for such an
injury. Id.; see Nees v. Julian Goldman Stores, Inc., 109 W. Va. 329, 154 S.W. 769 (1930). In
Nees, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals discussed some of the elements of damages
that an injured plaintiff could recover under the law of West Virginia. 109 W. Va. at 340, 154
S.W. at 774. The West Virginia court stated that the injured plaintiff in Nees could recover
damages for physical pain, mental anguish and impairment of capacity to enjoy life. Id. The
Nees opinion is unclear as to whether mental anguish and impairment of capacity to enjoy life
are separable elements of damages. Id. The Nees court discussed mental anguish and impairment
of capacity to enjoy life in both conjunctive and disjunctive terms and thus failed to distinguish
whether those injuries are separable or inseparable. Id.; see also Warth v. Jackson County
Court, 71 W. Va. 184, 76 S.E. 420 (1912). In Warth, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals listed mental anguish and impairment of capacity to enjoy life in conjunctive terms,
thereby implying that the two injuries are inseparable. 71 W. Va. at 190, 76 S.E. at 423.
20. 649 F.2d at 272-73. The Fourth Circuit in Flannery stated that the ambiguity
surrounding the question of whether income taxes should be deducted from an award for lost
future earnings is the result of an absence of clear precedent on the issue. Id. The district court
in Flannery decided that West Virginia law did not require the deduction of federal income
taxes in computing lost future earnings. Flannery, slip op. at 5-8; see Crum v. Ward, 146 W.
Va. 421, 122 S.E.2d 18 (1961). In Crum, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals refused
to allow the consideration of federal income taxes in computing lost future earnings on the
ground that it would only confuse the jury. 146 W. Va. at 444, 122 S.E.2d at 31. The Fourth
Circuit in Flannery ruled that Crum is limited to jury trials and therefore whether federal
income tax should be considered in computing lost future earnings in situations where a judge
is the finder of fact, as in all FTCA actions, is a proper question for certification to a state
supreme court. 649 F.2d at 273. See 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1982) (any FTCA action brought against
United States shall be tried by court without jury).
21. 694 F.2d at 271. The Fourth Circuit in Flannery certified two questions to the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals pursuant to West Virginia's certification statute. Id.; see
W. VA. CODE § 51-lA-I-10 (1981) (setting forth power and procedure of West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals to answer question of law certified to it by federal and state appellate courts).
The Fourth Circuit first asked whether under West Virginia law a semicomatose plaintiff is
entitled to recover for the impairment of his capacity to enjoy life despite his inability to sense
his injuries. Flannery, 694 F.2d at 273. The Fourth Circuit also questioned whether under West
Virginia law the trial court, when sitting as the finder of fact, must deduct from a plaintiff's
lost future earnings the amount of federal income taxes that would have been levied had the
plaintiff earned the money. Id.
22. Flannery v. United States, 297 S.E.2d 433, 439 (W. Va. Sup. Ct. App. 1982). The
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Flannery stated that loss of the capacity to enjoy
life was a separate element of damages. Id. at 438. The Court held that a plaintiff in a personal
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The West Virginia court also held that a court need not deduct federal

income taxes when calculating an award for lost future earnings.23
After receiving the responses to the certified questions from the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, the Fourth Circuit decided to reconsider
the Flannery case on other grounds. 24 Specifically, the Fourth Circuit stated

that it would address the federal question of extra-compensatory damages
raised by the defendant that the Fourth Circuit had failed to consider when

it originally heard the Flannery case. 25 The defendant in the Flannery case
had raised the issue of whether the FTCA allows damages that state law
labels as compensatory but which exceed the damages necessary to compensate the actual losses sustained. 26 The Fourth Circuit stated in Flannery that

courts may award only compensatory damages in an action brought under
the FTCA.2 7 The Flannery court therefore ruled that any damages which
compensate a plaintiff in an amount greater than the actual loss suffered are
28
punitive and barred by the FTCA.
injury action who has been rendered permanently semicomatose may recover for impaired
capacity to enjoy life. Id. at 439. The West Virginia court ruled that damages for impaired
capacity to enjoy life are a measure of the permanency of the plaintiff's injuries and do not
require the plaintiff to be conscious of his injuries. Id. at 438-39; see Jordan v. Bero, 158 W.
Va. 28, 54, 210 S.E.2d 618, 623 (1974) (future effects of injury that have reduced capability of
individual to function as whole person are element of damages separable from pain and
suffering). The West Virginia court in Flannery thus avoided the ambiguity created by the Nees
and Warth decisions by labeling the award for impaired capacity to enjoy life a permanent
injury award, independent of the plaintiff's consciousness. Flannery, 297 S.E.2d at 437-39; see
supra note 19 (discussing Nees and Warth).
23. Flannery, 297 S.E.2d at 441. In determining whether a court must deduct an amount
for federal income taxes in damage awards, the West Virginia court in Flannery refused to
make a distinction between a trial before a judge and a trial before a jury. Id. at 439. The
court accepted as the majority view the Crum court's reasoning that the impact of income taxes
need not be considered in calculating an award for impairment of future earning capacity. Id.
at 441; see supra note 20 (discussing Crum).
24. 718 F.2d at 110.
25. Id.

26. Brief for Appellant at 13, Flannery v. United States, 718 F.2d 108 (4th Cir. 1983).
The United States in Flannery argued that all non-compensatory damages are barred under the
FTCA. Id. The Fourth Circuit in Flannery ruled that questions concerning the extent of the
waiver of sovereign immunity, specifically whether a damage claimed under the act is punitive
or compensatory, is a matter of federal law. 718 F.2d at 110. The Flannery court stated that
the courts should interpret the FTCA under a uniform federal standard rather than under the
widely varying state laws. Id.
27. 718 F.2d at 110. The Fourth Circuit in Flannery stated that the FTCA provides a
waiver of sovereign immunity from suit on behalf of the United States. Id. The Fourth Circuit
further stated that the courts must strictly enforce the limitations on damages attached to the
FTCA because Congress did not intend to expose the United States to unlimited liability. Id.
The Fourth Circuit concluded that the FTCA's proscription of punitive damages dictates that
courts must limit the United States' waiver of sovereign immunity to the extent that plaintiffs
may only recover compensatory damages. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982); infra note 28 and
accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's distinction in Flannery between punitive and
compensatory damages).
28. 718 F.2d at 111. The Flannery court cited several cases in support of its ruling that
the FTCA authorizes only compensatory damage awards. Id.; see D'Ambra v. United States,
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The Fourth Circuit in Flannery specifically held that the district court's
award of 1,300,000 dollars for plaintiff's loss of the capacity to enjoy life
was punitive in nature and exceeded the parameters of the FTCA. 29The
Flannery court stated that while the plaintiff did lose his capacity to enjoy
life, the plaintiff would never be conscious of his loss. 3 0 The Fourth Circuit
also reasoned that since the plaintiff would never be aware of his loss of
capacity to enjoy life or be able to benefit from the monetary damages

awarded for that loss, the district court's award provided no benefit or
compensation to the plaintiff.3 ' Thus the Fourth Circuit concluded that the
481 F.2d 14, 16-18 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1075 (1973). In D'Ambra v. United
States, plaintiffs brought an action under the FTCA for the wrongful death of their son in an
accident that occurred in Rhode Island. Id. at 15. The trial court applied the Rhode Island
Wrongful Death Act to determine damages. Id. The Rhode Island Wrongful Death Act provides
for an award to the surviving parents based upon the decedent child's economic loss. Id. at 16.
Under the Rhode Island Wrongful Death statute a decedent's economic loss is determined by
estimating the decedent's gross earnings over his lifetime, reducing the estimated gross earnings
by the estimated personal expenses of the decedent, and finally, discounting the result to present
value. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the Rhode Island
Wrongful Death Act was not applicable as the proper measure of damages because it was
punitive to the extent that it compensated the plaintiffs beyond their actual loss. Id. at 17. The
Fifth Circuit reasoned that the plaintiffs' loss in D'Ambra was the loss of society and
companionship of their child and not the child's economic loss. Id. at 20-21. In essence, the
D'Ambra court held that to the extent which an award under the FTCA exceeds the amount
necessary to compensate the plaintiffs' actual loss, it is punitive and not allowable under the
FTCA. See id.
The Fourth Circuit in Flannery also relied on a recent decision by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 718 F.2d at 111. In Felder v. United States, the Ninth Circuit
held that a damage award for lost future earnings which does not deduct federal income taxes
overcompensates the plaintiff in violation of the FTCA's proscription of punitive damages. 543
F.2d 657, 670 (9th Cir. 1976). The Felder court reasoned that since an uninjured, working
plaintiff's earnings would be subject to federal income taxation, an award that does not deduct
taxes would overcompensate the plaintiff by awarding him more than the plaintiff would have
had if the injury had not occurred. Id. The Flannery court stated that an award which gives a
plaintiff more than the actual loss sustained is punitive under the FTCA, regardless of the lack
of the deterrent and punishing features normally connected with punitive damages. 718 F.2d at
111; see infra notes 50-58 and accompanying text (analysis of view that only actual or
compensatory damages are recoverable under FTCA).
29. 718 F.2d at 111; see infra notes 59-68 and accompanying text (analysis of whether
comatose plaintiff may recover damages for loss of enjoyment of life under FTCA).
30. 718 F.2d at 111. The Flannerycourt stated that the plaintiff was conscious of nothing
in his comatose condition and that no likelihood existed that the plaintiff would regain
consciousness. Id. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the plaintiff would never be
conscious of his loss of enjoyment of life and could not be compensated for a loss of which he
is unaware. Id.
31. Id. The Fourth Circuit in Flannery stated that the district court's awards for future
medical care and lost future earnings would provide all of the plaintiff's future needs. Id. The
Flannery court then stated that since the plaintiff is permanently comatose, he cannot spend or
give away, nor derive any benefit from an award of $1,300,000 for loss of the capacity to enjoy
life. Id. The Flannery court stated that the district court's award for loss of capacity to enjoy
life would only benefit the plaintiff's surviving relatives. Id. The Flannery court concluded that
since the award for loss of capacity to enjoy life could not compensate the plaintiff, the award
was punitive under the terms of the FTCA. Id.; see supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text
(only actual or compensatory damages recoverable under FTCA).

700
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amount of damages awarded for
loss of capacity to enjoy life were punitive
32
under the terms of the FTCA.

The Fourth Circuit in Flannery also held that the district court's award
for lost future earnings, as calculated without deducting federal income
taxes, overcompensated the plaintiff in violation of the terms of the FTCA.33
The Flannery court stated that if the plaintiff had not been injured his

earnings would have been subject to the deduction of federal income taxes.

4

The Fourth Circuit reasoned, therefore, that an award for lost future earnings
calculated without deducting federal income taxes awards the plaintiff an
amount greater than that which he would have earned had the plaintiff not

been injured.

5

The Fourth Circuit concluded that since the FTCA's pros-

cription of punitive damages only allows compensatory damage awards, an

award for lost future earnings that overcompensates a plaintiff by6 failing to
3
deduct federal income taxes is not permissible under the FTCA.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit in Flannery held that the district court must
reduce the award to the plaintiff for lost future earnings because the award
partially duplicated the plaintiff's award for future medical expenses. 37 The

Fourth Circuit stated that although in most cases an injured plaintiff would
pay his living expenses from the award for lost future earnings, the plaintiff
in Flannery would not have to do so because the award for future medical

expenses included an amount for the plaintiff's total care in a nursing home
for the rest of his life.3 8 The Fourth Circuit stated that as a result the United
States would be forced to pay the plaintiff's future living expenses twice,

once in the form of lost future earnings and again as future medical
expenses.3 9 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the award for future medical

expenses resulted in the plaintiff being overcompensated in violation of the
32. 718 F.2d at I11.
33. 718 F.2d at 111; see infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text (analysis of whether
courts must deduct federal income taxes when calculating an award for impaired earning
capacity under FTCA).
34. 718 F.2d at 111. The Fourth Circuit in Flannery noted that a living person's earnings
are subject to federal income taxation. Id.
35. Id. at 111-12.
36. Id.; see supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's ruling
in Flannery that court may allow only compensatory awards under FTCA); infra notes 50-58
and accompanying text (analysis of view that only actual or compensatory damages are
recoverable under FTCA).
37. Id. at 112. The United States in Flannery did not question the district court's award
for lost future earnings on the ground that the award partially duplicated the award of future
medical expenses, thereby overcompensating the plaintiff in violation of the FTCA's proscription
of punitive damages. Id.; see Brief for Appellant, Flannery v. United States, 718 F.2d 108 (4th
Cir. 1983). The Fourth Circuit in Flannery raised the issue of duplicative awards sua sponte.
Id.
38. 718 F.2d at 112-13.
39. Id. at 112. The Flannery court stated that the plaintiff would receive living expenses
from both the lost future earnings award and from the nursing home component of the medical
expenses award. Id.; see infra notes 74-81 and accompanying text (analysis of whether award
for future medical expenses partially duplicates award for lost future earnings).
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FTCA's proscription of punitive damages. ° As a result, the Fourth Circuit
held that the district court's awards to the plaintiff for loss of capacity to
enjoy life and lost future earnings overcompensated the plaintiff in violation
of the FTCA. 41 The Flannerycourt vacated the district court's judgment and
remanded the case for a redetermination of the damage awards in a manner
42
consistent with the Fourth Circuit's opinion.
In contrast, the dissent in Flannery argued that although the district
court's awards to the plaintiff may have exceeded the plaintiff's actual losses,
the awards did not violate the punitive damage proscription of the FTCA. 43
The Flannery dissent rejected the majority's premise that any damage award
which allows a plaintiff an amount greater than the actual loss is punitive
and thus barred by the FTCA. 44 The dissent argued that the purpose of
ordinary tort damages is both to compensate the plaintiff and to deter the
tortfeasor. 45 In contrast, the dissent argued, courts award punitive damages
for the sole purpose of punishing the wrongdoer.4 6 The dissent reasoned,
therefore, that courts may award tort damages to a plaintiff that exceed the
plaintiff's actual loss without actually awarding "punitive" damages. 47 The
dissent argued that Congress proscribed punitive damages awards under the
FTCA only to prevent retributive punishment against the United States and
not to prohibit all awards which exceed a plaintiff's actual loss.

48

The

40. 718 F.2d at 112. The Fourth Circuit in Flannery ruled that a successful plaintiff
should be made only as financially secure as he would have been had no injury occurred. Id.;
see infra notes 50-58 and accompanying text (only actual or compensatory damages are
recoverable under FTCA).
41. 718 F.2d at 112.
42. Id.at 113.
43. Id. at 114-15 (Hall, J., dissenting); see infra notes 44-49 and accompanying text
(discussing Flannery dissent's interpretation of punitive damages under FTCA).
44. 718 F.2d at 114-15. The dissent in Flannery cited Kalavity v. United States to support
the view that not all damages awarded to a plaintiff in excess of the plaintiff's actual loss are
punitive within the terms of the FTCA. Id. (citing 584 F.2d 809, 811 (6th Cir. 1978)). In
Kalavity, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated that damages are
punitive when awarded for the sole purpose of punishing a wrongdoer who acted maliciously
or wantonly. 584 F.2d at 811. The Kalavity court ruled, therefore, that in a wrongful death
action brought under the FTCA, a compensatory damage award to the decedent's spouse could
not be reduced on the ground that the spouse had remarried and received support from her
new husband. Id. The Kalavity court held that such an award did not constitute an award of
punitive damages in violation of the FTCA. Id.
45. 718 F.2d at 114-15 (citing 584 F.2d at 811 (6th Cir. 1978)).
46. Id. Punitive damages are an exception to the rule that courts award damages for the
purpose of compensation. C. McCoRinc, LAW OF DAmAGEs § 77 at 275 (1935). Courts award
punitive damages to punish the defendant for wanton conduct and not to compensate for any
loss of the plaintiff. Id.
47. 718 F.2d at 114-15. In essence, the dissent in Flannery argued that damages which
overcompensate a plaintiff are not punitive unless the court awards the damages for the purpose
of punishing the defendant. See id.
48. Id. The dissent in Flannery did not cite any legislative history supporting its position
that the FTCA's proscription of punitive damages does not prohibit all awards which exceed a
plaintiff's actual loss. See id. at 113-15.
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Flannery dissent concluded that since the district court did not award any
damages to the plaintiff for the purpose of punishing the United States, the

damages were not punitive under the terms of the FTCA, and therefore the

49
law of West Virginia controlled the question of damages.

The Fourth Circuit in Flannery based its holding on a proper interpretation of the FTCA's proscription of punitive damage awards.so The FTCA

directs a district court to determine liability and damages in an action
brought under the FTCA in accordance with the law of the state where the
tort occurred.-' An express exception to the FTCA's mandate that courts

must determine damages in accordance with state law is that courts shall not
impose punitive damages on the United States even if state law provides for
a punitive damage sanction. 2 Thus, in an FTCA action in which the court's
application of state law would result in a punitive damage award if the
defendant were a private citizen, a court may not impose such punitive
damages against the United States.5 3 The question whether the application

of state law results in compensatory or punitive damages under the terms of
the FTCA is a question of federal law, since only federal law can interpret
the meaning of terms in federal statutes.5 4 Although the FTCA does not
49. 718 F.2d at 113-15. The dissent in Flannery noted that the FTCA states that the
amount of damages are a matter of state law so long as the state does not hold the United
States liable for interest prior to judgment or punitive damages. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2674
(1982). The dissent reasoned, therefore, that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals'
responses to the Fourth Circuit's certified questions were dispositive on the issue of damages,
since the damages awarded were not punitive under the FTCA. 718 F.2d at 113-14; see supra
notes 21-23 and accompanying text (discussing West Virginia law as applied to certified questions
in Flannery); see also supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text (discussing Flannery dissent's
view that district court's damage awards were not punitive).
50. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982); see infra notes 51-58 and accompanying text (analysis
of meaning of punitive damages as proscribed by FTCA).
51. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (1982) (United States shall be liable for tort claims in
same manner and to same extent as private individual under similar circumstances); see supra
note 13 and accompanying text (discussing application of state law to determine liability and
damages under FTCA).
52. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982) (United States shall not be liable for punitive damages
under FTCA); see supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing FTCA's proscription of
punitive damages); see also infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text (discussing what constitutes
punitive damages under FTCA).
53. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982). In Ferrero v. United States, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that, in an action brought under the FTCA, a court must
determine damages according to the law of the state where the tort occurred except that the
state may not impose punitive damages on the United States. 603 F.2d 510, 512 (5th Cir. 1979).
In an earlier decision, Hartz v. United States, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit ruled that to the extent a state wrongful death statute allows recovery in an FTCA
action by a survivor, any amount that a court awards in excess of the actual loss suffered by
the survivor was punitive. 415 F.2d 259, 264 (5th Cir. 1969). The Hartz court held, therefore,
that the FTCA precluded the trial court from awarding a judgment in excess of the survivor's
actual loss. Id.
54. See D'Ambra v. United States, 481 F.2d at 18. The Fifth Circuit in D'Ambra held
that the application of the Rhode Island Wrongful Death Act, in an action brought under the
FTCA, resulted in punitive damages in violation of the FTCA. Id.; see supra note 28 and
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define punitive damages specifically, most federal courts have interpreted the
FTCA's proscription against punitive damages as meaning that plaintiffs

may recover only compensatory or actual damages in actions brought under
the FTCA. 55 Compensatory or actual damages are those which compensate
a plaintiff's actual losses.5 6 Punitive damages as proscribed by the FTCA are

damages that exceed an FTCA claimant's actual losses.57 Therefore, the
accompanying text (discussing D'Ambra). The D'Ambra court ruled that whether a damage
award received under the Rhode Island Wrongful Death Act is punitive or compensatory, within
the terms of the FTCA, shall be determined by the practical effect of the Wrongful Death Act's
application. 481 F.2d at 18. The D'Ambra court stated that the language of the Wrongful
Death Act and the state's characterization of the act as punitive or compensatory were not
controlling. Id. The Fifth Circuit in D'Ambra ruled that whether damages are punitive or
compensatory within the terms of the FTCA is a federal question. Id.; see also Laird v. Nelms,
406 U.S. 797, 798-99 (1972) (application of FTCA is federal question); Southern Pacific Transp.
Co. v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 1186, 1188 (E.D. Cal. 1979) (federal law governs interpretation of terms in FTCA).
55. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1982). The legislative history of the FTCA does
not define the term punitive damages. See H.R. REP. No. 1287, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-7
(1945); Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978). In Birnbaum v. United States,
two individuals whose letters to and from the Soviet Union were opened and copied by the CIA
brought suit against the United States under the FTCA seeking compensatory damages for
alleged mental anguish. Id. at 321. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed the district court's holding that the United States was liable to each claimant for
$1,000. Id. at 335. In upholding the damage award, the Second Circuit ruled that the FTCA
limits recovery to compensatory damages and provides that the United States shall not be liable
for punitive damages. Id. at 333. The Birnbaum court defined punitive damages as damages
beyond compensatory damages that are awarded to deter repetitive conduct. Id. at 334. The
Birnbaum court upheld the district court's damage award of $1,000 since the evidence supported
a finding that the plaintiffs had suffered personal anguish worth $1,000, thereby making the
award compensatory and not punitive. Id. at 335; see Occhino v. United States, 686 F.2d 1302,
1306 (8th Cir. 1982) (only compensatory damages recoverable under FTCA); United States v.
English, 521 F.2d 63, 70 (9th Cir. 1975) (where state law allows punitive damages or application
of state law results in award which exceeds compensatory damages, only compensatory damages
may be awarded under FTCA); Abille v. United States, 482 F. Supp. 703, 711 (N.D. Cal. 1980)
(state law determines amount of damages under FTCA but FTCA limits damages to compensatory damages). But see Kalavity v. United States, 584 F.2d at 811 (award of damages in excess
of plaintiff's actual loss, in FTCA action, is not punitive under terms of FTCA).
The primary goal of tort damages is to place the injured person as nearly as possible in
the condition he would have occupied had the wrong not occurred. See C. McCopICK, LAW
OF DAMAoES § 137 at 560 (1935). The Fourth Circuit's interpretation in Flannery of the FTCA
as limiting damages to compensatory damages is consistent with the primary aim of tort
damages. See 718 F.2d at 11; MCCORMICK, supra, at 560. An award which compensates an
FTCA claimant's actual loss, and no more, places that claimant as nearly as possible in the
condition he would have occupied had the wrong not occurred.
56. See Birdsall v. Coolidge, 93 U.S. 64 (1876). In Birdsall v. Coolidge, the Supreme
Court stated that compensatory and actual damages are the same concept. Id. at 64. The
Supreme Court in Birdsall defined compensatory or actual damages as damages resulting from
the proven injury. Id. The Court further stated that courts should only award damages that
compensate equally for the injury that a plaintiff has suffered. Id.; see United States v. State
Road Dept. of Florida, 189 F.2d 591, 596 (5th Cir. 1951) (compensatory damages are damages
awarded in satisfaction of loss sustained), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 903 (1952).
57. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982). Since the FTCA's proscription of punitive damages
permits courts to award only compensatory damages, any award which exceeds the amount
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FTCA's proscription of punitive damages limits an FTCA claimant's recovery
to an amount that will compensate and not exceed the claimant's actual

losses.

5

The FTCA's provision barring the award of any damages beyond those
that compensate a plaintiff's actual losses justifies the Fourth Circuit's

holding in Flannery that the plaintiff should not receive a damage award for
loss of the ability to enjoy life.5 9 The plaintiff in Flannery is permanently
comatose and thus unable to sense his loss.60 Since the plaintiff is not
conscious of his loss of ability to enjoy life, no monetary award could
compensate the plaintiff for that loss. 6 1 Therefore, awarding the plaintiff in
Flannery damages for loss of capacity to enjoy life would overcompensate

the plaintiff in violation of the FTCA. 62 The Fourth Circuit's holding in
Flannery also derived support from case law. 63 Although some courts have
held that loss of the ability to enjoy life is a proper element of damages, 64
no court ever has awarded damages to a permanently comatose tort victim

for loss of the ability to enjoy life.6 5 Courts have awarded only damages for
sufficient to compensate the plaintiff for his actual losses is punitive under the FTCA. See
supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (analysis of FTCA's proscription of punitive damages).
58. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982); see also supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text
(analysis of FTCA's proscription of punitive damages).
59. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's holding in
Flannerythat FTCA's proscription of punitive damages bars award for loss of capacity to enjoy
life to comatose plaintiff); see also infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text (analysis of whether
FTCA's proscription of punitive damages bars award for loss of capacity to enjoy life).
60. 718 F.2d at 110; see supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing physical and
mental condition of plaintiff in Flannery).
61. 718 F.2d at 110. The district court's awards in Flannery for lost earnings and medical
expenses covered all of the plaintiff's past obligations and future needs resulting from his
injuries. Flannery, slip op. at 10-I1. Since the plaintiff is incapable of sensation and all his
needs are met by the awards for lost earnings and medical expenses, the award for loss of
enjoyment of life cannot further compensate the plaintiff.
62. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982); supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text (FTCA's
proscription of punitive damages means that only compensatory damages are awardable under
FTCA).
63. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (discussing relevant case law supporting
Fourth Circuit's position in Flannerythat FTCA's proscription of punitive damages bars award
for loss of ability to enjoy life to comatose plaintiff).
64. See, e.g., Culley v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 244 F. Supp. 710, 714-15 (D. Del. 1965)
(loss of enjoyment of usual or familiar things in life is proper element of damages in personal
injury action by plaintiff who sustained painful back injury); McAlister v. Carl, 233 Md. 446,
-,
197 A.2d 140, 146 (1964) (damages claimed for loss of enjoyment of life due to an enforced
change in vocation are submissible to jury); Warth v. Jackson County Court, 71 W. Va. 184,
190, 76 S.E. 420, 423 (1912) (loss of impairment of capacity to enjoy life is recoverable element
of damages in personal injury action by plaintiff who suffered broken arm in horse and buggy
accident).
65. See Note, Nonpecuniary Damagesfor Comatose Tort Victims, 61 GEO. L.J. 1547,
1556 (1973). To date, cases awarding damages for loss of enjoyment of life involved victims
who were conscious of their loss. See id. For example, in Frankel v. United States, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania awarded $650,000, for physical
and mental pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, inconvenience, disfigurement and
permanent injuries, to an FTCA claimant who suffered brain damage and other injuries in an
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loss of capacity to enjoy life in cases in which the plaintiff was conscious of
his loss. 66 Likewise, the Fourth Circuit held that the court in Flanneryshould

not award damages to the comatose plaintiff for loss of capacity to enjoy
life because no monetary award could return the plaintiff to the condition

he would have occupied had the injury not occurred. 67 The Fourth Circuit
correctly concluded, therefore, that awarding a permanently comatose plain-

tiff damages for loss of the ability to enjoy life is noncompensatory and

6
violates the punitive damage proscription of the FTCA. 1
The FTCA's provision barring the award of any damages beyond those
that compensate a plaintiff's actual losses also justifies the Fourth Circuit's
holding in Flannery that courts must deduct federal income taxes from the

plaintiff's award for lost future earnings. 69 The majority of the federal circuit
courts of appeals have held that courts must deduct federal income taxes

when computing an award for lost future earnings in an FTCA action. 70 The
auto collision. 321 F. Supp. 1331, 1338-39 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 466 F.2d 1226 (3rd Cir.
1972). The plaintiff in Frankelwas fully conscious of her loss of enjoyment of life. Id. at 1338.
Similarly, in Haynes v. Waterville & 0. Street R. Co., the Maine Supreme Court awarded loss
of enjoyment of life damages to a young boy whose hand had to be amputated. 101 Me. 335,
-,
64 A. 614, 615 (1906). The plaintiff in Haynes was fully conscious of his loss of capacity
to enjoy life which resulted from the amputation. Id.
In contrast, the plaintiff in Flanneryis completely unaware of his loss of capacity to enjoy
life because he is permanently comatose. 718 F.2d at 110-I1; see supranote 10 and accompanying
text (discussing medical condition of plaintiff in Flannery).
66. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing plaintiff's consciousness as
requirement for loss of enjoyment of life).
67. 718 F.2d at 111.
68. Id.; see supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text (plaintiff in Flannery cannot be
compensated for loss of capacity to enjoy life); see also supra note 50-58 and accompanying
text (FTCA limits plaintiff's recovery to compensatory damages).
69. 718 F.2d at 111; see 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982); see also supra notes 33-36 and
accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's holding in Flannery that court must deduct
federal income taxes from plaintiff's award for lost future earnings).
70. See Harden v. United States, 688 F.2d 1025, 1029 (5th Cir. 1982). In Harden, plaintiffs
brought an FTCA suit against the United States for the wrongful death of their son. Id. at
1026. Under the law of the state of Georgia where the wrongful death occurred, taxes and other
personal expenses of a decedent are not deducted from wrongful death awards. Id. at 1029.
Nevertheless, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the district
court did not err in deducting income taxes from the decedent's expected earnings. Id. at 1030.
The Harden court noted that the FTCA limits recovery to compensatory damages. Id. at 1029.
The Harden court reasoned, therefore, that a court must deduct income taxes from future
earnings awarded under the FTCA in order to avoid an award of punitive damages. Id. The
Harden court thus ruled that a noncompensatory damage award constitutes punitive damages
under the FTCA. See id. Similarly, in Felder v. United States the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that when calculating lost earnings on incomes greater than
$30,000, failure to deduct income taxes in calculating lost earnings results in a punitive damage
award in violation of the FTCA. 543 F.2d 657, 670 (9th Cir. 1976). The Felder court reasoned
that failure to deduct income taxes would result in the plaintiff receiving greater compensation
that he would have if he had not been injured. Id. The Felder court ruled that such
overcompensation would render the award punitive in effect. Id.; see also Hartz v. United
States, 415 F.2d 259, 264 (5th Cir. 1969) (trial court may properly consider impact of federal
income taxes when calculating lost future earnings); cf. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444
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courts of appeals have reasoned that a healthy, working person may only
spend his earnings after federal income taxes have been deducted from his
earnings. 71 Courts have held, therefore, that an award for lost future earnings
calculated without deducting federal income taxes gives the plaintiff an
72
amount greater than he would have received had he not been injured.
Therefore, an award of damages for lost future earnings calculated without
deducting taxes overcompensates the plaintiff in violation of the FTCA's
73
proscription of punitive damages.
The Fourth Circuit in Flannery may have held erroneously that the
plaintiff's award for lost future earnings should also be reduced by the
amount of the award for future medical expenses. 74 The Fourth Circuit stated
that an award for lost future earnings after taxes is compensatory and
provides for, among other expenses, a plaintiff's living expenses. 75 The
Flannery court noted that, in the plaintiff's comatose state, the award for
future medical expenses would cover all of the plaintiff's future living
expenses since the medical expenses award included total care in a nursing
home for the remainder of the plaintiff's life. 76 The Fourth Circuit in
Flannery reasoned that the court must reduce the plaintiff's future earnings
award after taxes by the award for future medical expenses in order to avoid
double payment of living expenses which would overcompensate the plaintiff
in violation of the FTCA. 77 While the Fourth Circuit properly was concerned
with avoiding any overcompensation of the plaintiff, the court may have
erred by assuming that the district court's award for future medical expenses
was equivalent to the amount of the plaintiff's living expenses had he not
been injured. 78 If the award for future medical expenses was less than the
U.S. 490, 494 (1980) (evidence of effect of income taxes on future earnings is admissible in
wrongful death action brought under Federal Employers' Liability Act).
In Flannery, the plaintiff's lost future earnings were calculated by using projections that
the plaintiff's annual income would rise from $17,481 in 1978 to $182,795 in 2017. 718 F.2d at
112. This range of projected income falls within the rationale of Felder, which deducts income
taxes from incomes in excess of $30,000. See Felder, 543 F.2d at 670.
71. See United States v. Furumizo, 381 F.2d 965, 971 (9th Cir. 1967) (reasonable certainty
exists that FTCA claimant, if uninjured, only would have had taxed earnings available for
disposal, as opposed to untaxed earnings).
72. Id.; see Felder v. United States, 543 F.2d 657, 670 (9th Cir. 1976). The Felder court
ruled that failure to deduct income taxes from an award for lost future earnings would be
punitive under the FTCA since such an award would result in the plaintiff receiving more
money that he would have had the injury not occurred. Id.
73. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text (analysis of whether federal income
taxes must be deducted when caluclating award for lost future earnings under FTCA).
74. 718 F.2d at 112-13; see supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth
Circuit's holding in Flannery that district court's award for lost future earnings partially
duplicates award for future medical expenses).
75. 718 F.2d at 112.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982); see supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text (analysis
of FTCA's proscription of punitive damages as limiting recovery to compensatory damages);
see infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (analysis of how Fourth Circuit in Flannery may
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plaintiff's personal living expenses if uninjured, the plaintiff would be
overcompensated in violation of the FTCA. 79 However, if the award for
future medical expenses exceeded the plaintiff's personal living expenses if
uninjured, the plaintiff would be undercompensated for his losses.8 0 To
properly compensate the plaintiff in Flannery, the district court, on remand,
should reduce the plaintiff's award for lost future earnings after taxes by
the estimated amount of the plaintiff's personal living expenses had he not
been injured. 8'
The Fourth Circuit in Flannery v. United States correctly interpreted the
FTCA's proscription of punitive damages to limit a plaintiff's recovery to
s
compensatory damages for actual losses.Y
The Flannery court's decision is
consistent with the primary goal of both the FTCA and tort law, which seek
to restore an injured plaintiff as nearly as possible to the condition he would
have occupied if the wrong had not occurred. 83 The Flannery court properly
rejected the reasoning of the dissent, which advocated an interpretation of
the FTCA's proscription of punitive damages that would bar only damages
that a court awarded separately for the sole purpose of punishing the United
States84 The dissent's interpretation would have resulted in overcompensating
the plaintiff in violation of the FTCA without furthering the goal of tort
damages.85 After Flannery, FTCA claimants in the Fourth Circuit will be
limited justly to recovering compensatory damages for their actual losses,
regardless of the damages allowed by the law of the state where the tort
occurred. 6 The Flannery doctrine will eliminate the variance in compensatory

have erred by assuming that district court's award for future medical expenses was equivalent
to plaintiff's future living expenses had he not been injured).
79. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982). If the award for future medical expenses was less than
the amount of the plaintiff's future living expenses if uninjured, then deducting the award for
future medical expenses from the award for lost future earnings would give the plaintiff more
than he would have had if he had not been injured. The plaintiff thus would be overcompensated
in violation of the FrCA. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (FTCA limits plaintiff's
recovery to compensatory damages).
80. See MCCORMCK, supra note 55, at 560 (primary goal of tort damages is to place
injured person as nearly as possible in condition he would have occupied had wrong not
occurred).
81. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674. Only by reducing the award for lost future earnings by an
amount equivalent to an accurate estimate of the plaintiff's living expenses if uninjured, will
the plaintiff be placed as nearly as possible in the condition he would have occupied had the
wrong not occurred.
82. See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text (analysis of FTCA's proscription of
punitive damages as limiting recovery to compensatory damages).
83. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (analyzing FTCA proscription of punitive
damages and primary goal of tort damages).
84. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text (discussing Flannery dissent).
85. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text (discussing Flannery dissent); see also
supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text (analysis of FTCA's proscription of punitive damages).
86. See supra notes 59-81 and accompanying text (analysis of Flannery court's reduction
of district court's awards to compensatory amount).
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damages awarded under state law by promoting the evenhanded treatment
87
of compensatory damages under the FTCA.

DANA J.mms BOLTON

B.

The FELA and an Employer's Right to Sue: Property
Damages Resulting from Employee Negligence

In 1908, Congress enacted the Federal Employers' Liability Act' (FELA)
to ensure the liability of railroads engaged in interstate commerce for personal
injuries or death sustained by their employees while employed in interstate
commerce. 2 The FELA states that railroads are liable to their employees for
87. See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text (analysis of FTCA's proscription of
punitive damages as limiting recovery to compensatory damages).
1. Federal Employers' Liability Act, ch. 149 §§ 1-8, 35 Stat. 65, 66 (1908), amended by
ch. 143, § 2, 36 Stat. 291 (1910) (adding § 9 to Federal Employers' Liability Act) and ch. 685,
§ 3, 53 Stat. 1404 (1939) (adding § 10 to Federal Employers' Liability Act) (codified as amended
at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982)). Congress first enacted the Federal employers' Liability Act in
1906. See ch. 3073, §§ 1-3, 34 Stat. 232 (1906). The United States Supreme Court held the Act
of 1906 unconstitutional on the grounds that the Act exceeded Congress' power to regulate
interstate commerce, as granted in Article 1, section 8, clause 3 of the United States Constitution,
because the Act applied to employees who were injured while employed in interstate and
intrastate commerce. See Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 496-502, 504 (1908); U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. Congress responded with the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)
of 1908 which applies only to employees of railroads engaged in interstate commerce who are
injured or killed while employed in interstate commerce. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1982). The FELA of
1908 is within the constitutional power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. Walsh v.
New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 173 F. 494, 495 (C.C. D. Mass., 1909), aff'd, 223 U.S. 1 (1912);
Watson v. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co., 169 F. 942, 955 (C.C. E.D. Ark., 1909), aff'd, 223
U.S. 745 (1912). See generally P. DOHERTY, THE LIAUrrY OF RAILROADS TO INTERSTATE
EIPLOYEES (1911) (discussing nature and scope of FELA).
2. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982). The FELA was a statement of public policy that reformed
unjust rules of the common law that exempted railroads from liability for injuries to their
employees. S. REP. No. 432, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1910). The FELA abolished the commonlaw rule of liability which barred recovery against a railroad for the injury or death of an
employee resulting from the negligence of a fellow employee. See 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1982) (railroad
liable for injury or death of employee resulting from negligence of another employee); S. REP.
No. 460, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1908); H.R. REP. No. 1386, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1908).
The rationale for holding an employer liable for the negligence of an employee which results in
injury or death to another employee is that the injured employee has no control or voice in the
selection of his fellow employees. Watson v. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co., 169 F. 942, 949
(C.C. E.D. Ark., 1909), aff'd, 223 U.S. 745 (1912).
The FELA also moderated the common-law rule of contributory negligence which barred
an injured employee's recovery when the trier of fact found any negligence on the part of the
employee. See 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1982) (contributory negligence on part of employee does not bar
recovery but court will reduce damages in proportion to employee's negligence); S. REP. No.
460, supra, at 2-3; H.R. REP. No. 1386, supra, at 1, 3-6. Since railroad employees must work
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injuries caused in whole or in part by the negligence of the railroad.3 Some
sections of the FELA specifically preclude negligent railroads from avoiding
the liability imposed by the Act.4 For example, section 5 of the FELA
provides that any contract, rule, regulation or device designed to exempt a

railroad from liability under the FELA is invalid.5 In addition, section 10
voids any contract, rule, regulation or device which has the purpose, intent,
or effect of preventing railroad employees from providing voluntary infor-

mation to an FELA claimant concerning the facts surrounding the injury or
6
death.

in the constant presence of danger, Congress precluded contributory negligence from providing
negligent railroads with a total defense to an FELA claim. S. RP. No. 460, supra, at 3.
The FELA also bars a railroad from asserting the common law defense of assumption of
the risk under certain circumstances. See 45 U.S.C. § 54 (1982); S. RP. No. 460, supra, at 2;
H.R. R P. No. 1386, supra, at 6. Under the FELA, an employee is held not to have assumed
the risks of employment when the injury resulted in whole or in part from the railroad's
negligence. 45 U.S.C. § 54 (1982). The FELA also states that an employee has not assumed the
risks of employment in any case where injury resulted from a railroad violation of an employee
safety statute. Id. The rationale for limiting the defense of assumption of the risk is that in a
complex industry an employee cannot be expected to have notice of and assume all the risks of
his employment. S. RaP. No. 460, supra, at 2.
Finally, the FELA abolishes the common-law right of railroads to exempt themselves from
liability for injured employees through employment contracts or other arrangements between
the railroad and its employee. See 45 U.S.C. § 55 (1982) (any contract, rule, regulation or
device designed to exempt railroad from liability under FELA is void); S. RaP. No. 470, supra,
at 3; H.R. REP. No. 1386, supra,at 6-8. Congress enacted § 5 of the FELA to prevent railroads
from exempting themselves from all FELA liability through contracts with their employees. S.
REP. No. 460, supra, at 4.
Prior to enactment of the FELA, many states enacted similar statutes reforming the
common-law liability of railroads. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 1294K (1904); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 56
(1897); GA. CODE § 2297 (1895). Congress enacted the FELA to provide uniformity in the area
of railroad liability. H.R. RaP. No. 1386, supra, at 3.
3. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1982). Specifically, the FELA holds railroads liable to their employees
.or injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any officers, agent or
employees of the railroad, or as a result of any defect or insufficiency in the railroad's
equipment due to the railroad's negligence. Id.
4. See infra notes 5-7 and accompanying text (discussing §§ 5 and 10 of FELA).
5. 45 U.S.C. § 55 (1982) (codifying Federal Employers' Liability Act § 5). Section 5 of
the FELA provides that in any FELA action, the railroad may set off any sum it has contributed
to any insurance relief benefit or indemnity funds, which may have been paid to the injured
employee as a result of the injury or death that is the basis for the FELA claim. Id. The
primary purpose of § 5 of the FELA is to prevent railroads from utilizing employment contracts
that release the railroad from liability for injuries sustained by their employees. See S. REP.
No. 460, supranote 2, at 3; H.R. RaP. No. 1386, supra note 2, at 6; see also Kozar v.Chesapeake
& Ohio Ry. Co., 320 F. Supp. 335, 384-85 (W.D. Mich. 1970) (public policy of § 10 of FELA
is to disallow releases and other similar devices for avoiding railroad's FELA liability), aff'd in
part, vacated in part, 449 F.2d 1238 (6th Cir. 1971).
6. 45 U.S.C. § 60 (1982) (codifying Federal Employers' Liability Act § 10). Section 10
of the FELA provides that any person convicted of attempting to prevent another person from
providing an FELA claimant with information concerning the facts of the injury or death, or
who attempts to discharge or discipline an employee for doing the same, shall be punished by
a fine of up to $1,000 or imprisoned for up to one year, or both, for each offense. Id. The
purpose of § 10 of the FELA is to ensure that an injured employee can obtain freely all
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An injured railroad employee who seeks recovery under the FELA in a
federal court must file a complaint in a federal district court to commence
the action.7 The railroad must answer the complaint.' Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 13(a)9 (rule 13(a)) compels each defendant to assert in its answer
any claim it has which arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
basis of the plaintiff's claim. l0 In Cavanaugh v. Western MarylandRy. Co.,"
the Fourth Circuit considered whether, in an FELA action, a compulsory
counterclaim for property damages brought by a railroad constituted a device
to avoid liability under the FELA or to impede the availability of evidence
to an FELA claimant.

12

In Cavanaugh, the plaintiff served as an engineer on a Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad Company (B&O) train that collided with another B&O train
in West Virginia.' 3 Cavanaugh initiated an FELA action in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, seeking recovery
for personal injuries sustained in the collision. 4 Pursuant to West Virginia

available information to substantiate his claim. Hendley v. Central of Georgia R. Co., 442 F.
Supp. 482, 484 (D. Ga. 1977) (purpose of § 10 is to prevent coercion or intimidation of persons
upon whom FELA claimant depends to substantiate his claim), rev'd on other grounds, 609
F.2d 1146 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1093 (1980).
7. See 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1982) (FELA action may be brought in United States district
court); FED. R. Civ. P. 3 (action must be commenced by plaintiff's filing complaint with court).
The injured employee must serve the summons and complaint on the railroad. See FED. R. Civ.
P. 4 (explaining service of process).
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a). A defendant must serve his answer within 20 days after
summons and complaint have been served upon him. Id.
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a). A party to an action in federal court must include in his
answer, as a counterclaim, any claim he has against the opposing party if such claim arises out
of the occurrence that is the basis of the opposing party's claim. Id. The purpose of requiring
a party to assert a rule 13(a) compulsory counterclaim is to promote judicial efficiency. See C.
WIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 390 (3rd ed. 1976); see also United States v. Heyward-Robinson Co.,
430 F.2d 1077, 1082 (2d Cir. 1970) (purpose of rule 13(a) is to prevent fragmentation of
litigation and multiplicity of suits), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1021 (1971). A court may preclude a
party who fails to assert a rule 13(a) compulsory counterclaim from later bringing an action on
the claim. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) advisory committee note 7; WRIGHT, supra, at 390; 6 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1417 (1971); see Mesker Bros.
Iron Co. v. Donata Corp., 401 F.2d 275, 279 (4th Cir. 1968) (final judgment on merits of
primary claim is res judicata as to that claim and any compulsory counterclaims that defendant
failed to assert).
10. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing FED. R. Crv. P. 13(a)).
11. 729 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 222 (1985). In Cavanaugh v.
Western MarylandRy. Co., the plaintiff named the Western Maryland and Baltimore and Ohio
railroad companies as defendants. Id. at 290. The facts are not clear whether one railroad or
both employed the plaintiff. Id. at 290 n.2. Both railroads admitted that at least one of them
employed the plaintiff as a railroad engineer. Id. The Fourth Circuit chose to leave the question
of whether either or both railroads employed the plaintiff to the district court. Id.
12. Id. at 290.
13. 729 F.2d at 290. In Cavanaugh, the plaintiff worked as an engineer on a B&O train
that collided with another B&O train moving in the opposite direction on a B&O track in
Morgan County, West Virginia. Id. The collision in Cavanaugh occurred on February 12, 1980.
Id.
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law and rule 13(a), the defendant railroads answered and asserted a counterclaim for property damages resulting from the collision.' 5 The plaintiff filed
a motion to dismiss the railroads' counterclaim on the ground that the
counterclaim violated sections 5 and 10 of the FELA. 16 The district court
agreed and dismissed the railroads' counterclaim on the ground that the
counterclaim constituted a device designed to avoid FELA liability in viola-

tion of section 5 of the FELA.' 7 The district court further ruled that the
railroads' counterclaim constituted a device designed to impede the plaintiff's
access to information concerning his FELA claim in violation of section 10
of the FELA. 5 The railroads appealed the order of the district court
dismissing their counterclaim, contending that the provisions of the FELA
do not bar a railroad's compulsory counterclaim for property damages. 9

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the railroads'
counterclaim, and held that the FELA does not prevent railroads from
asserting a compulsory counterclaim for property damages stemming from
20

an employee's negligence.
In examining the procedural issues in Cavanaugh, the Fourth Circuit
stated that under the common law of West Virginia an employer has a cause
of action against his employee for any property damages resulting from
negligent acts that an employee has committed within the scope of his
employment. 2' The Fourth Circuit in Cavanaugh also stated that rule 13(a)
14. Id. The plaintiff in Cavanaugh filed his FELA action on November 19, 1981. Id. The
plaintiff sought $1,500,000 in damages for injuries sustained in the collision. Id.
15. Id. The defendant railroads in Cavanaugh counterclaimed for $1,700,000 in property
damages for damage to their trains and related property sustained as a result of the collision.
Id.

16. Id. The plaintiff in Cavanaugh argued that the railroads' counterclaim constituted a
device intended to avoid liability under the FELA in violation of § 5, and that this device would
deprive the plaintiff of his right to an adequate recovery under the FELA. Id. at 291; see 45
U.S.C. § 55 (1982). The plaintiff also argued that maintenance of the railroads' counterclaim
would discourage persons privy to the accident from coming forward with information for fear
of being held liable on the railroads' counterclaim. 729 F.2d at 293. The plaintiff argued,
therefore, that maintenance of the railroads' counterclaim also would violate § 10 of the FELA.
Id.; see 45 U.S.C. § 60 (1982).
17. 729 F.2d at 291.
18. Id.

19. Id. at 290.
20. Id. at 294. The Fourth Circuit held in Cavanaugh that nothing in the FELA prevents
the railroads from filing a counterclaim for property damage in an FELA action. Id.; see infra
notes 21-34 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Cavanaugh).
21. 729 F.2d at 290-91. The Fourth Circuit in Cavanaugh cited National Grange Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Wyoming County Ins. Agency, Inc. as supporting the proposition that under West

Virginia law an employer has a cause of action against his employee for damages arising out
of negligent acts the employee commits within the scope of his employment. See id. at 291
(citing National Grange, 156 W. Va. 521, 524, 195 S.E.2d 151, 154 (1973). In National Grange,
an insurance agent allegedly negligently failed to keep a fire insurance policy in force. 156 W.
Va. at 522, 195 S.E.2d at 152. When a loss subsequently occurred, the insurance company
settled the policy holder's claim and filed suit against the insurance agent for his negligence in
failing to maintain the policy. Id. The National Grange court ruled that the agent had a duty

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:447

requires a party in federal court to assert as a counterclaim any claims arising
out of the transaction or occurrence that gave rise to the opposing party's
action. 22 In addition, the Fourth Circuit noted that failure to assert a
compulsory counterclaim may result in a waiver of the claim. 23 The Fourth
Circuit then reasoned that the railroads had to assert their compulsory
counterclaim for property damages in their answer to the plaintiff's FELA

claim or risk forfeiting the cause of action. 24 The Fourth Circuit concluded

their rule 13(a) counterclaim unless
that the railroads were entitled to assert
25

the FELA prohibited the counterclaim.

In analyzing whether the FELA barred the defendant railroads from

asserting the compulsory counterclaim, the Fourth Circuit examined the

language of sections 5 and 10 of the FELA,2 6 the legislative history of the

FELA 27 and relevant case law. 28 The Cavanaughcourt found no language in
sections 5 and 10 of the FELA that would bar the railroads' counterclaim

for property damages. 29 The Fourth Circuit also found nothing in the
to obey all reasonable instructions and to exercise reasonable care in carrying out the insurance
company's orders. 156 W. Va. at 524, 195 S.E.2d at 154. The National Grange court held that
the agent's violation of the duty to keep the insurance policy in force was simple negligence
and imposed liability on the agent to the company. Id. The Fourth Circuit in Cavanaugh stated
that, based on the common-law cause of action enunciated in National Grange, the railroads
had a cause of action against the plaintiff for alleged negligence resulting in damages to the
railroads' property. 729 F.2d at 290-91.
22. 729 F.2d at 291. The Fourth Circuit in Cavanaugh stated that if an employee sues his
employer in federal court for injuries arising out of a collision and the employer has a claim
for property damages against the employee arising out of the same collision, rule 13(a) compels
the employer to assert its claim as a counterclaim. Id.; see supra note 9 and accompanying text
(discussing FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a)).
23. 729 F.2d at 291; see Mesker Bros. Iron Co. v. Donata Corp., 401 F.2d 275, 279 (4th
Cir. 1968) (final judgment on merits of primary claim is res judicata as to that claim and any
compulsory counterclaim that defendant failed to assert); FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) advisory
committee note 7 (court may preclude party who fails to assert rule 13(a) counterclaim from
later bringing action on claim); 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MItLER, supra note 9, at § 1417.
24. 729 F.2d at 291. The Fourth Circuit in Cavanaugh stated that the railroads would be
barred from bringing their claim for property damages against Cavanaugh in any future action
if they did not assert that claim as a counterclaim and if the court rendered a final judgment
on the merits of Cavanaugh's FELA claim. Id. See FED. R. Cirv. P. 13(a); Mesker Bros. Iron
Co. v. Donata Corp., 401 F.2d 275, 279 (4th Cir. 1968) (final judgment on merits of primary
claim is res judicata as to that claim and any compulsory counterclaim that defendant failed to
assert).
25. 729 F.2d at 291.
26. 729 F.2d at 291-93; see infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text (discussing language
of §§ 5 and 10 of FELA).
27. 729 F.2d at 292-94; see infra notes 56-73 and accompanying text (discussing legislative
history of FELA).
28. 729 F.2d at 294; see infra notes 74-109 and accompanying text (discussing case law
relevant to Cavanaughholding).
29. 628 F.2d at 291-93. The Fourth Circuit in Cavanaugh ruled that the language of §§ 5
and 10 of the FELA prohibiting any contract, rule, regulation, or device does not include rule
13(a) counterclaims. Id. at 292. The plaintiff argued that § 5 of the FELA proscribes any device
a railroad might use to gain an exemption from FELA liability including, by implication, a
counterclaim for property damages brought by a railroad. Id. The Fourth Circuit disagreed
with the plaintiff and ruled that a valid counterclaim for property damages brought by a
railroad is not a device calculated to exempt the railroad from liability because regardless of
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legislative history of the FELA to indicate congressional intent to bar
compulsory counterclaims in FELA actions. 0 Finally, the Fourth Circuit
stated that relevant case law was in conflict over whether the FELA bars a
railroad from asserting a counterclaim for property damages. 3 Although no
other United States circuit court of appeals has considered the issue, the
Fourth Circuit examined several United States district court and state court
decisions that discussed whether the FELA bars a railroad from asserting a
counterclaim for property damages. 32 The Fourth Circuit in Cavanaugh
specifically rejected the reasoning of the Washington Supreme Court in Stack
v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul andPacific R. Co., a3 the only reported case
supporting the view that sections 5 and 10 of the FELA bar counterclaims
the counterclaim, the railroad could still be held liable to the plaintiff for any damages awarded
for the plaintiff's FELA claim. Id. The Fourth Circuit stated that the railroads' counterclaim
was simply a claim for the railroads' damages and not an attempt to gain exemption from
liability. Id.
Similarly, the Cavanaugh court rejected the plaintiff's contention that the railroads'
counterclaim constituted a device designed to prevent persons from voluntarily furnishing information to FELA claimants in violation of § 10 of the FELA. Id. at 293-94. The plaintiff argued
that the railroads' counterclaim violated § 10 of the FELA because maintenance of the counterclaim
would discourage parties who were involved in the accident from coming forward with information for fear of being named in the counterclaim. Id. at 293. The majority in Cavanaugh refuted
the plaintiff's argument and noted that the plaintiff's interpretation of § 10 of the FELA would
require that all parties privy to an accident be granted immunity from liability lest they be discouraged from furnishing information to an FELA claimant. Id. In other words, the Fourth Circuit
stated that § 10 of the FELA does not deny a railroad's right to counterclaim for property damages
when employees involved in the accident, who may have been negligent, would be discouraged
from testifying. See id. The Fourth Circuit denied that any such purpose exists in § 10 of the
FELA. Id.
30. Id. at 292-93. In Cavanaugh, the Fourth Circuit cited the legislative history of the
FELA to support the view that the proscription of any "device" in § 5 of the FELA refers to
contractual arrangements between a railroad and its employees designed to release the railroad
from liability for personal injuries. 729 F.2d at 292-93 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1386, 42 CONG.
REc. 4436 (1908)). The Fourth Circuit stated that a railroad's counterclaim for property
damages, based on as common-law cause of action, is not a contractual device designed to
exempt the railroad from FELA liability. 729 F.2d at 293. The Fourth Circuit ruled, therefore,
that a counterclaim is not the type of device Congress intended to invalidate by enacting § 5 of
the FELA. Id.
The Cavanaugh court also rejected the plaintiff's contention that Congress intended § 10
of the FELA to prohibit a railroad's counterclaim for property damages because other parties
privy to the accident would be reluctant to come forward with information for fear of being
named in the counterclaim. Id. The Fourth Circuit cited the United States District Court for
the District of Colorado's opinion in Stark v. Burlington Northern, Inc., to support the view
that the primary purpose of § 10 of the FELA was to prohibit railroad from adopting company
rules and practices that would impede an FELA claimant's access to information concerning
his claim. 729 F.2d at 293 (citing Stark v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 1061, 1062
(D.C. Colo. 1982)). The Fourth Circuit ruled, therefore, that a counterclaim is not a company
rule or practice designed to discourage witnesses from furnishing information to an FELA
claimant. 729 F.2d at 293 (citing 538 F. Supp. at 1061).
31. 729 F.2d at 294.
32. Id.; see infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text (discussing federal district court and
state court decisions on whether FELA bars railroad from asserting counterclaim for property
damages).
33. 94 Wash.2d 155, 615 P.2d 457 (1980).
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by railroads for property damages.3 4 The Fourth Circuit concluded that

nothing in the FELA expressly or implicitly bars a railroad from filing a
35
counterclaim for property damages in an FELA action.
The dissent in Cavanaugh argued, however, that allowing the railroads
to maintain a counterclaim violates sections 5 and 10 of the FELA. 36 The

dissent in Cavanaugh cited with approval the reasoning of the Washington
Supreme Court in Stack.37 The dissent argued that the railroads' counterclaim
34. 729 F.2d at 294. In Stack v. Chicago, M., St. P., & P. R. Co., an injured brakeman
and the widow of an engineer who was killed in a train collision brought actions under the
FELA against the railroad to recover damages. 94 Wash.2d at 156-57, 615 P.2d at 458. The
defendant railroad filed a counterclaim against the deceased engineer and third party claims
against the engineer's crew members for property damage allegedly caused by their negligence.
94 Wash.2d at 157, 615 P.2d at 458. The Stack court ruled that the railroad had a commonlaw right to sue an employee for property damage resulting from acts of negligence committed
by an employee within the scope of his employment. 94 Wash.2d at 158, 615 P.2d at 459.
The Stack court then examined whether the FELA had an effect on the railroad's commonlaw cause of action for property damages. 94 Wash.2d at 159-62, 615 P.2d at 459-61. The Stack
court ruled that the railroad's third party claims would inhibit the testimony of the third party
defendant crew members regarding the extent of their negligence in causing the collision which
injured the plaintiffs. 94 Wash.2d at 159, 615 P.2d at 460. The Stack court also stated that the
third party claims by the railroad might inhibit the testimony of the plaintiffs fellow employees.
Id. The Stack court held, therefore, that the railroad's third party claims violated § 10 of the
FELA, which prohibits any device that has the purpose, intent or effect of preventing an
employee from furnishing information to an FELA claimant. 94 Wash.2d at 162, 615 P.2d at
460-61. The Stack court further held that the railroad's counterclaim and third party claims
violated § 5 of the FELA by discouraging injured employees from filing FELA actions and by
reducing an employee's FELA recovery by the amount of property damages attributable to the
employee's negligence. 94 Wash.2d at 160, 615 P.2d at 460. Consequently, the Stack court ruled
that the railroad's counterclaim would in effect limit the railroad's FELA liability in violation
of § 5 of the FELA. Id. The Stack court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the counterclaim
and third party claims. 94 Wash.2d at 162, 615 P.2d at 461.
The Fourth Circuit in Cavanaugh rejected the reasoning of the Stack court on the same
grounds that it rejected the plaintiffs arguments, which were based on the Stack court's
rationale. 729 F.2d at 294. The Fourth Circuit noted that substantial authority existed, most of
it unreported, for the view that a railroad may counterclaim for property damages in an FELA
action brought against the railroad. 729 F.2d at 294. See, e.g., Consolidated Rail Corp. v.
Dobin, No. 82-2539 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (provisions of FELA do not bar railroad's common law
right to assert counterclaims against employees for property damages allegedly caused by their
negligence); Key v. Kentucky & Indiana Terminal R. Co., No. C-78 0313-L(A) (W.D. Ky. 1979)
(court denied plaintiff FELA claimant's motion to dismiss defendant railroad's counterclaim
for property damages); Cook v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., No. Civ. 75-0791-D (W.D.
Okla. 1977) (FELA claimant held liable on counterclaim of defendant railroad for property
damages); Kentucky & Indiana Terminal R. Co. v. Martin, 437 S.W.2d 944,951 (Ky. 1969)
(court allowed maintenance of counterclaim for property damages by defendant railroad but
later dismissed counterclaim on finding of contributory negligence); Capitola v. Minneapolis,
103 N.W.2d 867, 869 (1960) (court recognized
-,
St. P. & S.M.R. Co., 258 Minn. 206,
right of railroad to maintain counterclaim for property damages against FELA claimant); see
supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's rejection of plaintiff's
arguments in Cavanaugh).
35. 729 F.2d at 294. The Fourth Circuit in Cavanaugh reversed the district court's
dismissal of the defendant railroads' counterclaim and remanded the case for further proceedings
not inconsistent with its decision. Id.
36. Id. at 295 (Hall, J., dissenting); see infranotes 37-40 and accompanying text (discussing
reasoning of dissent in Cavanaugh).
37. 729 F.2d at 295. In essence, the dissent in Cavanaugh adopted the arguments and
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was a device to exempt the railroads from FELA liability by intimidating
the plaintiff into abandoning his FELA claim."8 The dissent agreed, therefore,
with the Stack court's holding that a railroad's counterclaim for property
damages violates section 5 of the FELA as a device designed to exempt the
railroads from liability under the FELA. 9 The dissent in Cavanaugh also
agreed with the Stack court's contention that the railroads' counterclaim
violated section 10 of the FELA by effectively preventing other employees
from coming forward with information for fear of being named in the
40
counterclaim as possible third party defendants.
Both rule 13(a) and the common-law right of an employer to sue an
employee for damages resulting from the employee's negligence support the
Fourth Circuit's holding in Cavanaugh that the railroads may maintain a
counterclaim for property damages against an FELA claimant. 4 The common-law rule states that an employer may assert a claim against his employee
for damages resulting from negligent acts committed by the employee within
the scope of his employment. 42 The Western Maryland and B&O railroads
claimed in Cavanaugh that the plaintiff's negligence, carelessness, and wanton, reckless misconduct solely and proximately caused the collision and
resulting property damage to the railroads' train and equipment. 43 The
railroads in Cavanaugh thus had a common-law right to assert the claim
that the plaintiff's negligence resulted in damage to their property. 4 Rule
13(a) requires a defendant to assert any claim, including a common-law
claim for property damages, that the defendant has against a plaintiff if the
reasoning of the Stack decision. See id.; see also Stack, 94 Wash.2d at 158-62, 615 P.2d at 45861 (Stack decision). The dissent in Cavanaugh also criticized the majority in Cavanaugh for
citing unpublished decisions to support its holding. 729 F.2d at 297. The dissent noted that
citation of unpublished decisions is disfavored in the Fourth Circuit. Id.; see 4mT CiR. R.
18(d)(ii); see also supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing reasoning in Stack); infra
note 76 (analysis of whether Fourth Circuit's use of unpublished decisions in Cavanaugh was
proper).
38. 729 F.2d at 296. The dissent in Cavanaugh reasoned that since the railroads'
counterclaim could deter the plaintiff from asserting his rights under the FELA, the railroads
could exempt themselves from liability in violation of § 5 of the FELA. Id.
39. 729 F.2d at 296; see Stack, 94 Wash.2d at 159-62, 615 P.2d at 459-60 (railroad's
counterclaim violates § 5 of FELA).
40. 729 F.2d at 296. The dissent in Cavanaugh reasoned that the threat of a counterclaim
for property damages would discourage witnesses from providing information to the FELA
claimant. Id.; see Stack, 94 Wash.2d at 158-62, 615 P.2d at 459-60 (railroad's counterclaim
violates § 10 of FELA).
41. See infra notes 42-49 and accompanying text (analysis of defendant railroads' counterclaim in Cavanaugh).

42. See Greenleaf v. Huntington & B.T.M.R. & Coal Co., 3 F.R.D. 24, 25 (E.D. Pa.
1942) (servant is liable to his master for loss caused to master by servant's breach of duty);
Stack v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R. Co., 94 Wash.2d 155, 158, 615 P.2d 457, 459 (1980)
(employer has common-law right to sue employee for property damage arising from acts of
negligence committed within scope of employment, unless otherwise barred); National Grange
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wyoming County Ins. Agency, Inc., 156 W. Va. 521, 524, 195 S.E.2d 151,
154 (1973) (insurance agent liable to insurance company for loss resulting from simple negligence
of agent); see also supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing National Grange).
43. Brief for Appellant at 3, Cavanaugh v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 729 F.2d 289 (4th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 222 (1985).
44. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing common law right of employer
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claim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the plaintiff's claim.4 5 In Cavanaugh, the plaintiff's claim for
personal injury damages and the defendant railroads' claim for property
damages both arose from the same occurrence, the train collision on February
12, 1980." Courts have defined a collision as an "occurrence" within the
meaning of rule 13(a). 47 The train collision in Cavanaugh was therefore an
occurrence within the meaning of rule 13(a) and since the defendant railroads'
claim for property damages arose from that occurrence, the claim was a
compulsory counterclaim. 4 The Fourth Circuit in Cavanaugh then considered
whether the FELA barred the defendant railroads from bringing an otherwise
49
valid rule 13(a) compulsory counterclaim for property damages.
The plain meaning of the FELA, the legislative history of the FELA and
relevant case law support the Fourth Circuit's decision to allow the railroads
to assert a rule 13(a) counterclaim for property damages in an FELA action. 0
The FELA does not bar expressly the assertion of compulsory counterclaims
for property damages by railroads.' In contrast, the FELA specifically bars
any contract, rule, regulation or device designed to avoid FELA liability or2
to impede an FELA claimant's access to information concerning his claim.1
to claim damages resulting from employee's negligence).
45. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a). Rule 13(a) requires a party to an action in federal court to
include as a counterclaim in his answer any claim he has against the opposing party if such
claim arises out of the occurrence that is the basis of the opposing party's claim. Id.
46. 729 F.2d at 290. In Cavanaugh, both the plaintiff's claim for personal injury damages
and the defendants' claim for property damages arose from the train collision of February 12,
1980 in Morgan County, West Virginia. Id.
47. See Sinkbeil v. Handler, 7 F.R.D. 92, 97 (D. Neb. 1946). In Sinkbeil, the plaintiff
brought a wrongful death action arising from an automobile collision. Id. at 95. The defendant
counterclaimed for personal injury and property damages resulting from the collision. Id. The
plaintiff moved to strike the defendant's counterclaim. Id. at 96. The Sinkbeil court denied the
plaintiff's motion to dismiss the counterclaim. Id. at 97. The Sinkbeil court ruled that since the
defendant's counterclaim arose out of the same collision as the plaintiff's claim, the collision
was an occurrence within rule 13(a), and thus made compulsory the filing of the defendant's
counterclaim. Id.; see Williams v. Robinson, 1 F.R.D. 211, 213 (D. D.C. 1940) (rule 13(a)
occurrence is happening, incident, or event); see also BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 974 (5th ed.
1979) (defining occurrence as happening, incident, or event).
48. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a); supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text (discussing rule
13(a) meaning of "occurrence"). Under rule 13(a) the defendant railroads had to assert their
counterclaim for property damages or risk waiving the right to assert the claim later. See FED.
R. Civ. P. Rule 13(a) advisory note 7.
49. 729 F.2d at 291-95. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that the rules shall
not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982). In Cavanaugh,
the railroads were entitled to assert a rule 13(a) compulsory counterclaim for property damages
unless the application of rule 13(a) would have abridged, enlarged or modified the injured
plaintiff's rights under the FELA. See id.
50. See infra notes 51-115 and accompanying text (analysis of whether FELA bars
railroad's assertion of counterclaim for property damages).
51. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982). The FELA contains no language which would bar a
railroad from bringing a compulsory counterclaim for property damages in an FELA action.
See id.
52. 45 U.S.C. §§ 55, 60 (1982) (codifying Federal Employers' Liability Act §§ 5 and 10).
Section 5 of the FELA expressly provides that any contract, rule, regulation, or device designed
to exempt a railroad from FELA liability shall be invalid. 45 U.S.C. § 55 (1982); see supra
note 5 and accompanying text (discussing § 5 of FELA). Section 10 of the FELA expressly
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The language of the FELA demonstrates that a rule 13(a) counterclaim based
on a common-law cause of action has not been held to be and was not
intended to be, a contract, rule, or regulation within the meaning of the
FELA. s3 Consequently, a court only may bar a railroad's counterclaim under
the FELA if the court finds that the counterclaim is a device to avoid liability
or impede a claimant's access to information. 54 The FELA provides no
express explanation of the meaning of the term device as used in sections 5

and 10 of the FELA

55

The Fourth Circuit in Cavanaugh also examined the legislative history
of the FELA to determine the meaning of the term "device." 56 The legislative
history of the FELA supports the Fourth Circuit's holding that a counterclaim for property damages brought by a railroad in an FELA action was

not a device within the meaning of a section 5.57 Congress enacted section 5
of the FELA to thwart a railroad's attempt to escape liability through the

use of contractual arrangements with its employees.58 Historically, railroads
provides that any contract, rule, regulation, or device, the purpose, intent, or effect of which
shall be to prevent a railroad employee from providing voluntary information to an FELA
claimant, shall be invalid. 45 U.S.C. § 60 (1982); see supra note 6 and accompanying text
(discussing § 10 of FELA).
53. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a); 45 U.S.C. §§ 55, 60 (1982). No court has ever held that a
rule 13(a) counterclaim is a contract, rule, or regulation within the meaning of the FELA. In
addition, the legislative history of the FELA does not support the contention that Congress
intended to bar a rule 13(a) counterclaim as a contract, rule, or regulation. See S. REp. No.
432, supra note 2, at 1-5; S. RaP. No. 460, supra note 2, at 1-4; H.R. REp. No. 1386, supra
note 2, at 1-9. Moreover, the legislative history of the FELA indicates that Congress used the
terms contract, rule, or regulation to refer to any contracts, rules or regulations that a railroad
might establish to exempt itself from FELA liability or impede an FELA claimant's access to
information concerning his claim. See H.R. RaP. No. 1386, supra note 2, at 6-7; S. RaP. No.
661, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1939) (purpose of § 10 of FELA is to prohibit railroads from
promulgating rules that discourage employees from giving information concerning accident to
anyone but company officials). As an example of the type of railroad practices that Congress
intended the FELA to invalidate, the House Report quoted a paragraph, entitled "Rules
governing employment by this company," from a railroad company's employment contract.
H.R. REp. No. 1386, supra note 2, at 6-7. The "Rules" included a clause stating that, in the
event of injury to the employee during his employment, the employee agrees to sign and deliver
to the railroad a release of all causes of action arising out of the injury. Id. Similarly, the
Senate Report referred to the practice by railroads of establishing company rules that prohibit
railroad employees from providing information concerning an accident to the injured FELA
claimant or his representative. S. RP. No. 661, supra, at 5. A rule 13(a) counterclaim is not a
contract, rule, or regulation established by a railroad. See FED. R. Crv. P. 13(a). A rule 13(a)
counterclaim, therefore, is not a contract, rule, or regulation within the meaning of the FELA.
54. 45 U.S.C. §§ 55, 60 (1982). If a rule 13(a) counterclaim is not a contract, rule or
regulation under the FELA, then the counterclaim is only invalid if it is a "device" under the
FELA. See id.
55. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982) (codifying the Federal Employers' Liability Act). The
provisions of the FELA neither define nor explain the term "device." See id.
56. 729 F.2d at 292-94; see supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth
Circuit's interpretation in Cavanaugh of FELA's legislative history).
57. See infra notes 58-67 and accompanying text (discussing congressional intent underlying enactment of § 5 of FELA).
58. See S. REP. No. 460, supra note 2, at 3. Section 5 of the FELA affects arrangements
that involve a waiver, either by the employee or by his dependents, of the right to recover
damages for the employee's injury or death caused by the negligence of the railroad. Id.
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used employment contracts, liability release forms and other similar arrangements with their employees to avoid liability.5 9 The legislative history of
section 5 of the FELA does not discuss the purpose underlying the inclusion
of the terms "rule," "regulation," or "device." ° The United States Supreme
Court in Philadelphia,Baltimore & Washington R. Co. v. Schubert6 ' has
suggested, however, that by including these terms in the FELA Congress did
not expand the stated purpose of section 5, which was to void contractual
arrangements railroads used to avoid liability. 62 Instead, the Supreme Court
stated that the terms "rule," "regulation," and "device" only seek to
effectuate the purpose of section 5 in situations other than those involving
actual contracts.63 The railroads' counterclaim in Cavanaugh was not a
Arrangements that relieve the employer's liability for negligence, such as liability release forms
and employment contract provisions, are void. Id.; see H.R. REP. No. 1386, supra note 2, at
7. At the time of the enactment of the FELA, the House Committee found that many railroad
employees were working under employment contracts that released the railroad from liability
for injuries caused by the negligence of other employees. Id. The Committee also found that
some railroads had established relief departments which compensated an employee for injuries
arising out of his employment in exchange for an employee agreement not to sue. Id. Under
the railroad relief program, the railroad would contribute money to the relief fund, and in
return the employee would sign a release form which discharged the railroad from all liability
for injury to the employee. Id. The House Committee found that the enactment of the FELA
was necessary to invalidate such inequitable contracts which prevented railroad employees from
recovering full damages for their injuries. Id. at 1. Section 5 of the FELA thus prohibits
employment contracts and other similar arrangements that a railroad might use to escape FELA
liability. Id. at 7.
59. See S. REP. No. 460, supra note 2, at 3; H.R. REP. No. 1386, supra note 2, at 1, 67 (discussing railroads use of employment contracts, liability release forms and other similar
arrangements with its employees to avoid liability for employee injuries).
60. See S. REP. No. 432, supra note 2, at 1-5; S. REP. No. 460, supra note 2, at 1-4;
H.R. REP. No. 1386, supra note 2, at 1-9.
61. 224 U.S. 603 (1912).
62. Id. In Philadelphia, Baltimore & Washington R. Co. v Schubert, the United States

Supreme Court considered whether a stipulation contained in a contract for membership in a
railroad relief fund fell within § 5 of the FELA's proscription of any contract, rule, regulation
or device designed to exempt a railroad from liability. 224 U.S. at 608. The contract stipulation
stated that if an employee accepted benefits from the relief fund, the employee could not
recover against the railroad for damages in a subsequent lawsuit. Id. The defendant railroad
argued that § 5 did not specifically preclude a relief fund contract stipulation. Id. at 611. The
Supreme Court ruled that the purpdse of Congress in employing the phrase "contract, rule,
regulation or device" in § 5 of the FELA was to expand the scope of the section and make it
broader through a generic, rather than a specific, description. Id. Therefore, the Court stated,
§ 5 covers every variety of agreement or arrangement whose purpose or intent is to enable a
railroad to escape FELA liability. Id. The Court held the railroad liable on the basis that § 5
of the FELA voided the relief fund contract stipulation which otherwise would have released
the railroad from liability. Id. The Schubert decision supports the Fourth Circuit's view in
Cavanaugh that Congress intended § 5 of the FELA to invalidate contractual arrangements that
directly exempt railroads from FELA liability. The assertion of a common law claim for
property damages under a rule 13(a) counterclaim, however, is not a contractual arrangement
that would exempt the railroads from FELA liability.
63. Id. at 611. In essence, the United States Supreme Court in Schubert held that although
§ 5 of the FELA does not expressly invalidate a relief fund contract stipulation that releases a
railroad from liability, the policy underlying § 5 prohibits a railroad from using the contract to
exempt itself from FELA liability. See id.
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contractual or similar arrangement established by the railroads to exempt
themselves from liability. 64 Regardless of the railroads' counterclaim, the
railroads still could be held liable on the plaintiff's FELA claim .6 s The
railroads' counterclaim was a valid common-law counterclaim for property
damages allegedly caused by an employee acting within the scope of his
employment.6 6 The legislative history of section 5 of the FELA reveals no

intent to prevent a railroad from asserting a valid common-law claim for
property damages. 67
The legislative history of the FELA also supports the Fourth Circuit's
holding in Cavanaugh that a counterclaim for property damages brought by

a railroad in an FELA action is not barred as a device within the meaning
of section

10.68

Congress enacted section 10 of the FELA to prohibit railroads

from preventing persons with information concerning an FELA claim from
giving that information to the claimant. 69 Historically, railroads enacted

company rules that prohibited railroad employees, under penalty of discharge, from giving information concerning an accident to anyone but a
company official. 70 The railroads' counterclaim for property damages in
Cavanaugh is not a railroad company rule designed to prevent employees
from furnishing information concerning an FELA claim. 71 Rather, the rail-

64. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a). The railroads' claim for property damages in Cavanaugh
derives from the common-law right of an employer to sue his employee for the employee's
negligent acts. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing common-law right of
employer to sue employee for damages resulting from negligent acts employee committed within
scope of employment). Federal practice compels the railroads to assert their common-law claim
as a counterclaim to the plaintiff's claim. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) advisory note 7; see supra note
9 and accompanying text (discussing mechanics of rule 13(a)). The existing common-law right
and rule 13(a) are not, therefore, contractual or similar arrangements established by the railroads
to avoid FELA liability.
65. See 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1982) (railroad is liable in damages for injury or death of
employee resulting from negligence of railroad).
66. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing common-law right of employer
to sue employee for property damages resulting from employee's negligence).
67. See S. REP. No. 432, supra note 2, at 1-5; S. REP. No. 460, supra note 2, at 1-4;
H.R. REP. No. 1386, supra note 2, at 1-9 (revealing no intent to prevent a railroad from
asserting a valid common-law claim for property damages against employee).
68. See infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text (discussing congressional intent underlying enactment of § 10 of FELA).
69. S. REP. No. 661, supra note 53, at 5. The Senate Report on the FELA stated that the
interests of society and justice require that injured railroad employees and railroads have equal
access to the facts surrounding an injury allegedly caused by a railroad's negligence. Id.
70. Id. The Senate Report on the FELA further stated that the railroads maintain wellorganized and highly efficient claim departments to protect the railroads from possible employee
suits for damages. Id.
71. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a). The railroads' claim for property damages in Cavanaugh
derives from the common-law right of an employer to sue his employee for the employee's
negligent acts. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing common-law right of
employer to sue employee for damages resulting from negligent acts employee committed within
scope of employment). Federal practice compels the railroads to assert their common-law claim
as a counterclaim to the plaintiff's claim. FED. R. Cirv. P. 13(a) advisory note 7; see supra note
9 and accompanying text (discussing mechanics of rule 13(a)). The existing common-law right
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roads' counterclaim in Cavanaugh is a federally compelled assertion of the
common-law right of an employer to recover for property damages caused
by a negligent employee.7 2 The railroads' counterclaim, therefore, will not
prevent, within the meaning of section 10 of the FELA, a7 person from

providing the plaintiff with information concerning his claim.

1

Cases interpreting the FELA also support the Fourth Circuit's conclusion
that a counterclaim is not a device designed to avoid FELA liability or to

impede an FELA claimant's access to information concerning his claim. 74
Prior to the Fourth Circuit's decision in Cavanaugh, neither the United
States Supreme Court nor any of the federal courts of appeals had ever

addressed the issue of whether the FELA bars a rule 13(a) counterclaim for
property damages asserted by a railroad in an FELA suit. Several federal
district courts, however, have decided the same issue. 7" For example, in

ConsolidatedRail Corp. v. Dobin,76 an FELA claimant moved to dismiss a

railroad's counterclaim for property damages on the ground that the railroad's claim violated the provisions of the FELA.7 7 In Dobin, the United

States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled that the
provisions of the FELA do not bar the common-law right of a railroad to

and rule 13(a) are not, therefore, railroad company established rules to prevent railroad
employees from providing voluntary information to an FELA claimant concerning the facts
surrounding the injury or death.
72. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text (discussing common-law right of
employer to sue employee for property damages, and employer's right to assert counterclaim
under rule 13(a)).
73. See 45 U.S.C. § 60 (1982). Congress intended § 10 of the FELA to prohibit railroads
from promulgating rules that directly prevent employees from providing information to FELA
claimants by threatening discharge from employment or disciplinary action. See S. REP. No.
661, supra note 53, at 5. While a counterclaim for property damages may discourage some
employees who were involved in the injury from providing information to an FELA claimant
for fear of possibly being held accountable for their own negligence, such indirect discouragement of negligent employees is not the equivalent of direct action by a railroad that Congress
intended to prohibit. See id.
74. See infra notes 75-109 and accompanying text (discussing FELA case law).
75. See infra notes 76-92 and accompanying text (discussing district court cases that have
examined whether FELA bars rule 13(a) counterclaim for property damages asserted by railroad
in FELA suit).
76. No. 81-2539 (E.D. Pa., Sept. 29, 1981) (appended to Brief for Appellant, Cavanaugh
v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 729 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1984) cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 222 (1985)).
The case of Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Dobin is an unreported decision. Nevertheless, the
majority in Cavanaugh cited Dobin and other unreported decisions as precedent. 729 F.2d at
294. The dissent in Cavanaugh criticized the majority's use of unreported cases and correctly
noted that the rules of the Fourth Circuit disfavor the use of unpublished decisions as precedent.
729 F.2d at 297; see 4TH Cm. R. 18(d)(ii). The dissent in Cavanaugh failed to note, however,
that the rules of the Fourth Circuit allow the use of unpublished decisions when the unreported
cases are related to the material issue and when no published opinions on point exist. See 4TH
CiR. R. 18(d)(iii). The paucity of published decisions with precedential value on the material
issue in Cavanaugh justifies the Fourth Circuit's use of unpublished dispositions in Cavanaugh.
See id.
77. Dobin, No. 81-2539 at 1.
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78
sue its employees for property damages allegedly caused by their negligence.
Without further comment, the Dobin court expressly rejected the reasoning

of the Washington Supreme Court in Stack which held that a railroad's
counterclaim for property damages constituted a device in violation of
79

sections 5 and 10 of the FELA.

The only federal district court decision supporting the view that the

FELA bars a counterclaim brought by a railroad is Shields v. Consolidated
Rail Corp.80 In Shields, three employees of the defendant railroad brought

an FELA action against the railroad for injuries sustained in an automobile
accident. 8' The railroad counterclaimed against Shields, one of the plaintiffs,

for indemnification in the event that the railroad was held liable to the other

two plaintiffs.8 2 The defendant railroad in Shields alleged that the plaintiff's
negligence had caused the accident and the injuries to the other plaintiffs. 3

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
noted that section 1 of the FELA provides that a railroad is liable in damages

for injuries to employees resulting from the negligence of any employee of

the railroad.14 The Shields court also noted that section 5 of the FELA
prevents a railroad from using any contract, rule, regulation or device to

exempt itself from FELA liability.8 - The Shields court, therefore, dismissed
the railroad's counterclaim for indemnification on the ground that the
counterclaim contravened the express purpose of section 1 of the FELA of

holding railroads liable for the negligence of their employees.8 6 The Shields
78. Id. at 1-2. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
in ConsolidatedRail Corp. v. Dobin stated that an employer has a common-law right of action
against its employee for property damage arising out of ordinary acts of negligence committed
within the scope of employment. Id. at 1. The Dobin court ruled that although the FELA
provides that a railroad is liable for its negligence resulting in injury to an employee, the
provisions of the FELA do not prevent a railroad from asserting a common-law right against
its employees for property damage caused by their negligence. Id. at 1-2.
79. Id. at 2. The Dobin court rejected without comment the view espoused by the Supreme
Court of Washington in Stack that a counterclaim brought by a railroad against its employee
for property damages is a "device" designed to exempt the railroad from liability or to impede
an FELA claimant's access to information concerning his claim in violation of §§ 5 and 10 of
the FELA. Id.; see supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing Stack).
80. No. 81 Civ. 4204, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1981) (available on LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist. file).
81. Id. at 2. The plaintiffs in Shields v. Consolidated Rail Corp. were riding in a truck
owned by the defendant railroad and operated by one of the plaintiffs when the truck in which
they were riding collided with another truck. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.; see 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1982) (railroad liable in damages for injury or death of
employee resulting from negligence of another employee).
85. Shields, slip op. at 4; see 45 U.S.C. § 55 (1982) (any contract, rule, regulation or
device designed to exempt railroad from liability under FELA is void).
86. Shields, slip op. at 4-5. The Shields court reasoned that the express purpose of § 1 of
the FELA, which holds railroads liable for the negligence of their employees, would be defeated
if a railroad could pass its FELA liability on to a negligent employee through a counterclaim
for indemnification. Id.
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court also dismissed the railroad's counterclaim for indemnification on the
ground that the counterclaim violated section 5 of the FELA as a device to
87
exempt the railroad from section 1 liability.

The Shields court's proscription of a railroad's counterclaim for indemnification as violative of the FELA is distinguishable from the Fourth

Circuit's decision in Cavanaugh.88 In Shields, the railroad's counterclaim for
indemnification attempted to pass the railroad's total liability on to the
negligent employee, in violation of section 1 of the FELA which expressly
holds railroads liable in damages for injuries to an employee caused by the
negligence of other employees. 89 In contrast, the railroads' counterclaim for
property damages in Cavanaugh was not an attempt by the railroads to
exempt themselves from FELA liability.90 Regardless of the railroads' counterclaim in Cavanaugh, the railroads could still be held liable on the FELA
claim for the plaintiff's injuries. 91 The railroads' counterclaim in Cavanaugh
was, therefore, a valid common-law claim for property damages and did not
contravene the purpose of the FELA to hold railroads liable for injuries
sustained by employees as a result of railroad negligence. 92
At the state court level, Stack v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul& Pacific
R. Co., is the only state supreme court decision to address whether a railroad
may bring a counterclaim for property damages in an FELA suit. 93 While
the Stack decision stands in direct conflict with the Fourth Circuit's opinion
in Cavanaugh,94 other lower state court decisions support the Cavanaugh
87. Shields, slip op. at 5-6. The Shields court stated that the railroad's counterclaim
against Shields for indemnification could directly exempt the railroad from liability, under
section 1 of the FELA, for the other two plaintiff's injuries. Id. The Shields court held,
therefore, that the counterclaim constituted a device designed to exempt the railroad from
FELA liability, in violation of § 5 of the FELA. Id.
88. See infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text (distinguishing Shields from Cavanaugh).
89. See Shields, slip op. at 3-6 (railroad counterclaimed for indemnification to exempt
itself from FELA § I liability); 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1982) (railroad is liable for injuries to employees
resulting in whole or in part from negligence of any employee of railroad).
90. See 729 F.2d at 292 (railroads' counterclaim in Cavanaugh for property damages is
not an exemption from liability for injuries to employees); 45 U.S.C. § 55 (1982) (any contract,
rule, regulation or device designed to exempt railroad from liability is invalid); see supra note
42 and accompanying text (discussing railroad's common-law right to sue employees for
negligence).
91. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1982) (railroad is liable in damages for injury or death of employee
resulting from negligence of railroad). If the court finds that the railroads in Cavanaugh were
negligent then the railroads will be liable in damages to the plaintiff. See id. Thus, while the
railroads' counterclaim in Cavanaugh may hold the plaintiff liable for any damages attributable
to the plaintiff's negligence, the counterclaim will not exempt the railroads from liability for
the plaintiff's injuries resulting from the railroads' negligence. Id.
92. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text (distinguishing Cavanaughfrom Shields).
93. See Stack, 615 P.2d at 459-61 (holding that railroad's counterclaim for property
damages constituted device in violation of FELA §§ 5 and 10); see supra note 34 and
accompanying text (discussing Stack).
94. Compare Stack, 615 P.2d at 459-61 (railroad's counterclaim for property damages
dismissed as violation of FELA §§ 5 and 10) with Cavanaugh, 729 F.2d at 290-94 (railroads'
counterclaim for property damages does not violate FELA §§ 5 and 10).
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decision. 95 For example, in Van Cleve v. ConsolidatedRail Corp.96 an Ohio

court overruled an FELA claimant's motion to dismiss the defendant railroad's counterclaim for property damages allegedly caused by the plaintiff's
negligence. 97 The Van Cleve court ruled that no language in the FELA
expressly or implicitly addresses the right of an employer to sue his employee
for property damage caused by the alleged negligence of the employee. 98 The
Van Cleve court stated that the FELA was aimed entirely at the reformation

of the common law to ensure an employee's right to recover for injuries
caused by a railroad's negligence. 99 The Van Cleve court further stated that
the railroad's counterclaim for damages did not interfere with the FELA's
purpose of holding railroads liable for negligent acts that result in injury to
an employee.100 The Van Cleve court held, therefore, that the FELA has no
effect on the common-law right of an employer to sue his employee for the
employee's negligent acts.' 0' Several other state courts decisions similarly

support the Fourth Circuit's decision in Cavanaugh allowing a counterclaim

02
for property damages brought by a railroad in an FELA suit.
Relevant case law discussing and construing the terms of sections 5 and
10 of the FELA also supports the holding of the Fourth Circuit in Cavanaugh

that a railroad's compulsory counterclaim for property damages is not a
device under section 10 of the FELA.103 A number of courts have considered
the meaning of the term "device" as used in the FELA. For example, in
Apitsch v. Patapsco & Back Rivers R. Co.,104 the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland ruled that a railroad's agreement with
the employee's union to process claims under the FELA in accordance with
95. See infra notes 96-102 and accompanying text (discussing state court decisions supporting Cavanaugh).
96. No. 79CV-01-93 (Ohio, July 26, 1979) (appended to Brief for Appellant, Cavanaugh
v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 729 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 222 (1985)).
In Van Cleve v. Consolidated Rail Corp., the plaintiff, a railroad engineer brought an FELA
suit against the defendant railroad for injuries sustained in a train collision. Id. The defendant
railroad alleged that the plaintiff's negligence was the sole cause of the collision. Id. The
railroad, therefore, filed a counterclaim for property damages against the plaintiff. Id. The
plaintiff moved to dismiss the railroad's counterclaim for property damages on the grounds
that the counterclaim constituted a device designed to exempt the railroad from FELA liability
in violation of § 5 of the FELA. Id.
97. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 98-101 (discussing Van Cleve court's reasoning).
98. No. 79CV-01-93 at 1.
99. Id.; see supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing FELA impact on commonlaw liability of employees).
100. No. 79CV-01-93 at I.
101. Id.
102. See Kentucky & Indiana Terminal R. Co. v. Martin, 437 S.W.2d 944, 951 (Ky. 1969)
(court allowed maintenance of counterclaim for property damages by defendant railroad in
FELA action but later dismissed counterclaim on finding of contributory negligence); Capitola
v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.M.R. Co., 258 Minn. 206, -, 103 N.W.2d 867, 869 (1960) (court
recognized right of railroad to maintain counterclaim for property damages against FELA
claimant).
103. See infra notes 104-109 and accompanying text (discussing judicial interpretation of
device under FELA).
104. 385 F. Supp. 495 (D. Md. 1974).
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state Workman's Compensation Act procedures was void as a device designed

to enable the railroad to avoid the full scope of its liability under the
FELA.'0 5 Similarly, in Culver v. Kurn,'06 an injured railroad employee, whose
employment had been terminated by his injury, released the railroad from
liability in consideration of re-employment.'07 The Supreme Court of Missouri
held in Culver that the injured employee's release of the railroad from
liability was invalid because it was a device designed to exempt the railroad
from FELA liability. 0 8 The interpretation of device in Apitsch and Culver

is consistent with the traditional definition of device which implies an
affirmative action, such as a release or a contractual agreement, taken with

the intent to deprive an injured employee of his right to recover.'

9

In

contrast, the defendant railroads in Cavanaugh merely acted upon the
common-law right to sue an employee for property damages by properly

bringing a counterclaim under rule 13(a)." 0 A compulsory counterclaim,
therefore, is not an express contract, release or similar device initiated by a
railroad to exempt the railroad from liability under the FELA or to impede
an FELA claimant's access to the facts surrounding his claim."' Therefore,
105. Id. at 504. In Apitsch v. Patapsco & Back Rivers R. Co., the plaintiff, a railroad
employee, brought an action under the FELA against the defendant railroad to recover damages
for injuries sustained as a result of a fellow employee's negligence. Id. at 497. The defendant
railroad argued that the plaintiff executed a settlement and release of his FELA rights which
barred the plaintiff from recovering in an FELA action. Id. at 497-98. The railroad specifically
argued that the plaintiff voluntarily elected to accept amounts payable to him in accordance
with the provisions of the Maryland Workman's Compensation Act in exchange for the
plaintiff's release of any possible FELA claims. Id. at 498. The United States District Court
for the District of Maryland noted that potential recovery under the FELA greatly exceeded the
amount recoverable under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Id. at 499. The Apitsch court
also found that the statement of rights accompanying the release agreement failed to explain
fully the plaintiff's rights under the FELA. Id. at 504. Therefore, the Apitsch court held that
the release agreement constituted a device designed to avoid the full scope of FELA liability in
violation of § 5 of the FELA. Id.
106. 354 Mo. 1158, 193 S.W.2d 602 (1946).
107. 354 Mo. at -, 193 S.W.2d at 604. The defendant railroad in Culver v. Kurn
terminated the employment of the plaintiff when the plaintiff was injured in the course of his
employment. 354 Mo. at -, 193 S.W.2d at 603. The defendant railroad had terminated the
plaintiff's employment in accordance with the defendant's policy of not retaining in their
employment any employee who had an unadjusted claim against the railroad. Id. In consideration of re-employment the plaintiff signed an agreement releasing the railroad from all liability
for the plaintiff's injuries. Id.
108. 354 Mo. at __,
193 S.W.2d at 604. The court in Culver reasoned that the release
prevented the plaintiff from claiming and suing for FELA liability and thus exempted the
railroads from FELA liability in violation of § 5 of the FELA. Id.; see Kozar v. Chesapeake &
Ohio Ry. Co., 320 F. Supp. 335, 384-85 (W.D. Mich. 1970) (FELA § 5 invalidates releases and
other exculpatory devices designed to exempt railroad from FELA liability).
109. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 407 (5th ed. 1979). BLACK's defines device as "[a]n
invention or contrivance; a result of design;... [a] plan or project; a scheme to trick or deceive;
a stratagem or artifice...." Id.
110. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing rule 13(a)).
111. See supranotes 109-110 and accompanying text (distinguishing a railroad's compulsory
counterclaim for property damages from a contract, release or similar device initiated by railroad
to exempt railroad from FELA liability).

